

THE AUSTRALIAN OUTLOOK

Vol. 10. No. 3

September, 1956

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The Dyason Lectures for 1956

By **Arnold J. Toynbee**

(1)

CAN WE LEARN LESSONS FROM HISTORY ?

Are there any lessons to be learned from history? Immediately, one thinks of one lesson which I am quite sure cannot be learned from history. History cannot, I believe, teach us to predict the future. Now, in the United States during the last elections, which were held in the autumn of 1954, many of the predictions that were made in advance turned out to be very wide of the mark; and we heard a great deal, good and bad, about those new electric brains or computers or calculating machines. Some people said that the error in the predictions was the mechanical computers' fault, and other people said that it was the fault of the human beings who fed the information into them, that the computers did not produce quite accurate results. But I feel very sure, myself, that prediction is impossible in human affairs, however skilfully we may develop our mechanical side. Suppose that history did tell us that, in the past, ten civilizations or twenty civilizations before our own had declined and fallen, and also did tell us some of the reasons for those declines and falls in the past, and suppose, further, that we found that in ten or twenty cases some of the reasons were identical; I am sure that, if we then fed into a machine the number of cases and, for each case, these identical reasons, and then inserted our own case and asked the machine to churn out a result for the future of our civilization, that machine would give us no result at all that would be worth considering.

There is, of course, something about the future that the lessons of history can tell us. They cannot foretell that our own civilisation is bound to go the same way as previous civilizations. But, if we have a knowledge—and I think we have—of some of these comparable situations in the past, that knowledge can tell us just one of the alternative possibilities in the future. What it cannot tell us is *all* the alternative possibilities in our future. And it certainly cannot tell us which of these many alternative possibilities—some of them unknown to us until they come upon us—is actually going to happen.

Now in the year 1956 we have electric computers. If we were living in the year 1656, we should not have had a computer to consult, but we should have fed the information of the past, not into a machine, but into

the brain of an astrologer. He would very readily have churned out for us a horoscope of our future; the future of a nation, of a civilization, or of an individual. But we know very well that this astrological pseudoscience did not really produce any results that one could seriously take into account. In this respect, public affairs—which are what one usually means by history—public affairs, over a long course of time, are not, I think, different from our own personal experience in one individual lifetime. We know very well, from our own experience, that we cannot learn from this experience either exactly what is going to happen to us in the future or, still more, exactly what we each of us ought to try to work for in our own personal future. Of course, experience, our own personal experience of the past, is invaluable to us. It gives us the only light on the future that we have. But, in one's personal life, one would never expect one's past personal experience to teach one exactly what one ought to do or exactly what is going to happen. I think the lesson of experience that we learn from our past personal life are general, not particular and not precise. And I think that is just as true for public affairs as it is for private affairs.

So, in this respect, that you cannot make a horoscope for the future, public affairs seem to be on the same footing as private affairs. But there is one point in which public affairs and private affairs are not like one another. In our private life our experience and our actions are confined to a single lifetime. But, in public affairs, many individuals, many lifetimes, many generations are involved. States and civilizations and societies and communities may last over hundreds and thousands of years. So here we have to ask ourselves: Can one learn lessons from the experience of one's predecessors?

Now our social heritage, what we call our civilization, is built up and handed on across the generations. But we also know that manners and customs and attitudes of mind change as one generation succeeds another. And we know very well that, at each transmission from parents to children, this social heritage is altered, even if the older generation and the younger generation are each trying to pass it on in exactly the form in which it was received from previous generations. We know that inevitably the transmission from one generation to another produces change. And that raises the question: Does not this break in tradition, even a very slight break in each generation, very soon—as generations pass and succeed one another—wipe out and efface and obliterate the lessons that any single generation learns?

Is it possible to hand on lessons of history over a very great number of generations? Are there some lessons in public experience that are so deeply engraved on the minds of the members of a society that these lessons can continue to be remembered, to be taken to heart, and to be acted on over a long series of generations? I believe that this is possible.

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I think one can see examples of it. And I would like, if I may, to give as illustrations two cases from the history of my own country, Britain.

We are very well aware of the happy relations, at the present day, between the Crown and the people in Australia, Britain, and other countries in the Commonwealth: the mutual affection; the very clearly established role of the Crown in the life of the country; the distinction between the political responsibility of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet on one side and the position of the Crown as the symbolic head of the State. Now I think that this rather happy political situation in our countries to-day is due to what is, I should say, perhaps the leading note of British political life in recent times, and that is a considerable sense of moderation—an inclination not to push party warfare to extremes. And I think this British political tradition of moderation very clearly goes back to one lesson which we, in Britain learned about three hundred years ago or a little more. I mean the lesson of King Charles's head.

The British, though they are fairly moderate in politics now, were the first Western nation in modern times to fight a very violent civil war and to take very drastic action. In the seventeenth century the Crown seemed to be encroaching on the traditional liberties and rights of the English and Scottish Parliaments and peoples. In England we had a most bloody civil war. At the end of it, the victorious party executed the King. And, immediately, results which they had never desired or intended arose from that. King Charles I lost his head because he had governed capriciously and autocratically. He was replaced by a military government; for the opposing party had created a first-rate professional army; and this army now took over the government of the country and imposed a much more burdensome tyranny than the Crown had had the means to do. They were much more efficient. So the first free elections, after that, produced a restoration of the monarchy. And eventually the Crown and the people settled down to a constitutional relation with one another. The lesson learned on both sides was one of moderation. The first son of King Charles I to succeed, King Charles II, did learn that lesson and kept his throne. Charles I's second son, James II, did not learn it and was turned out in the revolution of 1688. But the men who made that revolution were quite determined not to cut off King James II's head, because they were very well aware of the awkward consequences of cutting of the head of King Charles I; so they arranged that the deposed King James II should be able to run away in disguise. He got away, in disguise, in a boat, and then (you know the story) a fisherman recognised him and thought: 'Now if I bring him back to the Government, who certainly must be wanting to cut off his head, I shall get an immense reward.' So the fisherman seized James and brought him back—and, to the fisherman's astonishment and indignation, instead of getting a reward, he was scolded and told that he was a very officious and meddlesome man; and James II was allowed, after all, to escape.

Now the English Government who allowed him to escape knew that they would have great trouble from that. They knew that a king in exile would be a constant nuisance to them and a menace to them. And James II and his son and his grandson were, indeed, a great nuisance to the British Government for about three quarters of a century after that. But the Government recognized the truth that an exiled dynasty, alive and living in some comfort on the Continent, would be much less of a nuisance to them than a second martyred king; so they preferred the minor nuisance to the major one.

That is one lesson of history which we, in Britain, have learned, and have not yet forgotten. Here is another one. Perhaps one of the most striking features in the international landscape since the end of the Second World War has been the grant of self-government by Great Britain to a number of Asian and African countries which, until recently, were not considered by the British to be really capable of self-government. You will remember that in 1947 Great Britain gave self-government to India, to Pakistan, to Burma, and to Ceylon—four Asian countries which, between them, I suppose, contain about a sixth of the population of the whole World. And at this moment we are giving self-government to African countries—in West Africa, to Nigeria and to the Gold Coast. In this, Britain is applying to Asia and Africa the policy that she applied in the nineteenth century to a number of dominions of the British Crown whose population was of European origin and descent: first Canada and then Australia and New Zealand and South Africa.

Now, that policy, whether it is being carried out too fast or too slow, whether it is wise or foolish, however you may judge it—that policy is certainly the result of a lesson which we have never forgotten, which was taught us in the 1770's. You know what the lesson was—that there were then in North America thirteen dominions of the British Crown, very precious dominions at that time, which were ripe for self-government and were demanding it; but the Government in London was not willing, at that time, to give them what they were ready for; and as a result the British lost those North American colonies, instead of keeping that happy relation that we have with Canada and with India now. By contrast, we had a very unhappy relation with the United States for quite a long time, until quite recent times. And, though we are now friends again, the political connection between us has been severed irrevocably.

Well, those are two instances of learning the lessons of history which I have taken from the history of a particular country—my own. But, of course, I think there are lessons of history that have been learned by the whole human race.

I think one very obvious one is the lesson that it is not a good thing for one human being, one private human being, to enslave other human beings, to own them as if they were goods and chattels and property.

We know that, in the past, slavery has at different times and places played a central part in the economic and social life of great civilizations. It was central in the Greek and Roman civilization in the last two centuries before Christ. It was central in the civilization of the Ottoman Turks in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of the Christian Era. It was central in the life of the Southern States of the United States during the century ending in the 1860's. But now, to-day, I think, everywhere in the World, it would be recognised, as a result of learning and not forgetting—and as a result of transmitting from generation to generation this lesson of history—that slavery is inexpedient and wrong.

Of course, there is one kind of slavery—I am thinking of penal servitude—slavery imposed, not by one individual on another, but by Governments upon individuals, which does continue; and, I suppose, owing to the Original Sin in human nature, this is bound to continue, because I suppose we must have penal servitude as a punishment for certain kinds of crime. There have also been countries which other countries have criticized because they have applied penal servitude, not only as a punishment for common crimes, but as a punishment for political acts or tenets. But, you will notice that, even in such countries, though one might criticise the application of penal servitude for political reasons, there is no such thing to-day as private slavery. The Communist countries have gone rather further than other countries yet have in making private slavery impossible. In Communist countries even the voluntary employment of the services of one private individual by another is to-day against the law. So servitude there is entirely a monopoly of the state. And everywhere in the World now, I think, private slavery has been abolished owing to a real learning of the lesson that this is a bad thing. So I would suggest, from these examples—and I can think of many others—that the lessons of history can be learned.

But there is one question about the future which is in all our minds to-day, I think; and that is the question of war. We are bound to be thinking, as we think of the lessons of history: What are the lessons of history about war? And can we learn these lessons? The lessons of history about slavery have already led to the abolition of slavery. Dare we hope that the lessons of history about war may similarly lead to the abolition of war? And then we have to ask ourselves, of course, what *are* the lessons of history about war?

I think one lesson from the history of war is that most of the civilizations that have declined and fallen in the past have broken up and gone to pieces because, in their history, the ancient institution of war had got out of hand. But, as you look at the histories of the civilizations of the past on broad lines, you will, I think, find, in respect of war, a certain common pattern between them. I can think of the histories of the Greek and Roman civilization and the history of the ancient Chinese civilization

as two examples. Here, again, there are many more instances, but I will concentrate on these two, because I think you can see, rather clearly, the pattern in these examples. In these cases, at the earliest date at which you get a glimpse of the civilization rising, you find it divided up politically into a number of independent local sovereign states which do go to war with one another in spite of their having the same manners and customs and leading the same way of life and belonging, as we say, to one and the same civilization. Well, you find, in the earlier stages of the histories of these civilizations, that these fratricidal wars between different communities of the same civilization, though clearly they are a great tax on civilization and a great evil, are not yet a fatal evil. The evil is kept more or less within bounds because wars are waged on rather moderate lines at this early stage of a civilization's history.

Again, in all these past cases (I am not talking about us or about the future)—in all these past cases of history, one finds that at some stage these recurrent wars have got out of hand. They have become more and more devastating—taking a greater and greater toll from the life of the civilization—until, in the end, they have wrecked the society in which they have occurred. But it is interesting and alarming to see that the real devastation, the fatal devastation, was not the mere physical devastation but was the moral devastation. Physical devastation is not so appalling to us, because in our world, where, with our immense technological power, we have an unprecedented power of destruction, we also have an unprecedented power of physical reconstruction. After the First World War, everyone was surprised at the rapidity with which the damage of the war was repaired on the physical level. Again, after the far greater destruction of the Second World War, it has been remarkable how quickly the physical damage has been repaired. But perhaps the real damage, which is so much harder to repair, is the spiritual damage. The irreparable damage, after the First World War, was the effect on the spiritual state of Germany. The consequence of Germany's reaction to her defeat was the rise of Nazism, and the rise of Nazism produced the Second World War. The consequence of Russia's defeat in the First World War was the rise of Communism in Russia. The consequence of Italy's nominal victory but real defeat in the First World War was the rise of Italian Fascism. So one sees that, while physical damage is relatively easy to repair, the moral damage of war is the really serious effect. It is that which makes one war lead on to a worse war, and makes it very difficult to stop this fatal process when once it has started.

And then you see that, when a civilization that is declining and failing has brought itself to the point of destruction, it has sometimes won a reprieve for itself through the temporary imposition of a world-wide peace. I do not mean a literally world-wide peace, because, so far, no civilization has included literally the whole wide world. Perhaps our civilization is going to, but none of its predecessors have. I am thinking of those

'world-empires' like the Roman Empire or the Chinese Empire which seemed as if they were world-wide empires to the people that lived under them, and which did in fact include the whole area of a civilization which had previously been divided among a number of local warring states.

Now, in the past, as we know, this world peace has been bought at a terrible price. It has been bought at the price of a 'knock-out blow' by which one of the warring local states has finally overthrown the last of its competitors and, by doing that, has turned itself into a world empire. And we know from past history that the damage done by bringing war to an end in this way by a final 'knock-out blow' war—the damage done by that has been so grievous—the moral damage more so than the physical damage—that, in the past, a world empire like the Roman Empire or the Chinese Empire has never lasted continuously for more than a few centuries on end. Such empires have sometimes been re-established; for, once established, everyone has wanted them to continue. When they have fallen again, most people have wanted to set them up again, because the benefits of peace and order over a wide area have been so great. The task of achieving this has been so arduous and the memory of the past state of enmity and warfare and revolution has been so sharp and so continuous that, if it had just depended on the will of the population of the Roman Empire or the Chinese Empire, the Empire would have lasted forever.

Indeed, people have often been puzzled to find the reasons for those empires' decline and fall, in spite of this obvious benefit that they conferred, and this obvious support that they had in the popular will. But perhaps the reason for their decline and fall is that they were, in a sense, doomed to decline before they were brought into existence. They came into existence as a result of a series of wars in a kind of crescendo movement; and the final war, which was a most terrible war, left only one surviving great power. In fact, the process that led up to the foundation of these world empires in the past was so destructive that they were mortally wounded before they came into existence. Perhaps the decline and fall of the Greek and Roman civilization had begun *before* the Roman Empire was founded. The Roman Empire was an *effect* of the decline and fall; and, though it bought a reprieve, this reprieve was bound to be only a temporary one.

Now, if this very brief and crude sketch of the pattern of the history of the Greek and Roman World and the Ancient Chinese World has anything in it, then, looking at that past pattern and going on to look at the situation in our modern Western World to-day, we are likely to ask ourselves, I think: Can, we, in our World to-day, learn the lesson from the history of war? We all know, it is evident, that we are in danger of seeing our own Western Civilization go the same way as the Greek and Roman Civilization and as the ancient Chinese Civilization. In our modern

Western history we have been seeing our wars with one another, especially the fratricidal wars between the leading peoples of the West, become more and more devastating. That has been happening in the Western World from the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon onwards, anyway, as compared with the rather temperate wars of the eighteenth century, before the French Revolution. And in our own day we have seen two World Wars already of quite unprecedented intensity in moral as well as in physical destructiveness.

The application of modern science to the art of war has obviously made the physical devastation much worse. It has also increased the moral devastation, because it has made it possible to mobilise all the spiritual resources, as well as the physical resources, of the peoples and to draw the whole population into the hatred and malice and uncharitableness that is the state of mind of peoples at war. In our lifetime we have seen, first, the reduction of the number of great powers in our world from eight to two. At the outbreak of war in 1914, there were eight Great Powers in the World. To-day there are two only—the United States and the Soviet Union. And, since the end of the Second War, which left those two confronting one another, we have seen the invention of atomic weapons. Now I think it is evident from this that our civilization may go the same way—the same dreadful way—as its predecessors. But I, myself, firmly believe that we are not doomed to go the same way. Whether we go the same way or not will, I believe, depend on whether we do manage to learn the lesson of the destruction of past civilizations by war and to act on that lesson.

To *act* on that lesson is the important thing. Because the words 'learning a lesson' have several different meanings. When we say 'learning', we may mean just that we see, with our intellects, that those previous civilizations went down to destruction. But just learning a lesson, in that merely intellectual sense, does not carry us very far. When we talk about learning the lessons of history, we mean, of course, not just acquiring historical knowledge of the past, but acquiring that knowledge and then acting on that knowledge effectively, acting effectively, in the light of it, to save ourselves from going the same way, from making the same mistakes as the people made who have declined and fallen in the past. We mean taking action that will save us from bringing on ourselves the destruction which previous civilizations did bring on themselves by failing to learn the lessons of war at an early enough stage in their histories. I think that, in our world to-day, probably, most people who study our situation professionally as students of international affairs—I mean historians and people working in the governments of the leading countries—do know, with their minds, from the lessons of history, that a Third World War would almost certainly destroy our civilization. It might even destroy all life on Earth, for all that we know.

But the minority that knows this in this purely intellectual way can-

not convert their knowledge into action unless they are supported by the feelings and the action of the great majority which perhaps does not have the intellectual knowledge of the situation, anyway not in detail, in a professional way, but which does have the final say when it comes to taking action or not taking it. Of course, to-day the statesmen of the World have a far harder task than they had in the eighteenth century. Eighteenth-century statesmen were living and working in an aristocratic society in which a small minority was, for practical purposes, the body in the community which took the decisions; and this minority could count on the great majority following the lead that it gave. To-day we live in a world in which almost every adult inhabitant of a country is a voter, whatever his degree of education or his position in society. And we are also living now in a world in which it is not just the Western minority of the human race that counts. For several centuries, ending in our own lifetime, the World, as far as it was managed as a whole, was managed, not only by a very small class, at the top of society, but managed by that small class in very few countries of the World—just in the Western countries—in America and in Western Europe. Three-quarters of the human race were 'natives'. They were recognized as being human—for they did inhabit the countries in which they happened to be found—but they seemed to be at the dominant minority's disposal, like the flora and fauna of those countries, to do what these 'lords of creation' would wish them. But now we have seen that the 'natives' of former times are beginning to have a say. That is a very wholesome thing; it is the normal state of mankind; it was abnormal that a tiny Western minority should be all-powerful in the World. But this change makes the management of the World much more difficult.

In China, at the time of the Boxer Rebellion at the beginning of the present century, a very small expeditionary force from the West could restore order, so at that date the Chinese could be ignored by the leaders of the Western World, though they were, perhaps, one fifth of the human race. To-day we can no longer ignore China. Whatever our feelings about China, whatever our policy about China, we all agree that China is a greater factor in the World. And the peoples of Asia and Africa have noticed that, only fifty years after the Boxer uprising, the united forces of the Western World, with the help of some Asian countries as well, found it all that they could do to hold their own against the forces of China in Korea. This is a very big change in the World, and it means that the leaders now have not only to see the situation themselves, they have to carry with them the great mass of mankind; and this makes their task much harder. So it comes back to one's asking oneself: In our World to-day, are we going to learn the lessons of the history of War?

I think there is one favourable factor that we can see in our situation since 1945 to balance, to some extent, the unfavourable factor of the invention of atomic weapons. I think it is remarkable how the invention

of atomic weapons, and the certain effects of that invention in changing the character of war, have caught the imagination of the great mass of people. This is remarkable, considering that the invention of new and much more deadly weapons is not, of course, a new thing in history. Many times, in the past, new and deadlier weapons have been invented. When the horse was first tamed—and he was tamed first to be used for war—that was an immense and deadly new weapon that had devastating effects. When the cross-bow was invented in the eleventh century, the Pope felt so great a concern that he issued, I believe, an encyclical saying that Christians must not use the cross-bow against one another. Of course, they might use it against the heathen, but not against one another. When gunpowder was invented, the Papacy was not in a position to limit the use of new weapons, but it was recognized that war had been stepped-up in intensity by the invention of gunpowder. Each time, there was, I think, a minority in the World which understood the seriousness of this intensification of the effects of War for the prospects of civilization. But, perhaps, never before in history has the realization of the graveness of the effects of the invention of a new weapon been so widespread or so strongly felt as it is in our World to-day, just after we have invented the atomic weapon. I am sure that this is a very hopeful sign. I think it is very much in our favour in our struggle to solve this terrible problem of war.

Here is something, perhaps, for which one has no precedent in history. New things do obviously turn up in history for which there is no precedent, no past lesson. And atomic weapons do seem to have changed the nature of war. In the past, the presupposition of war was that a soldier, by fighting at the front, by risking his life, by giving his life if he had to give it, could save his family, his people, his country, from being invaded, overrun, and subjugated. When the three hundred Spartans gave their lives at Thermopylae, they correctly believed that they were saving Sparta to the rear of Thermopylae. To-day that is not true on the whole. Suppose that the three hundred Spartans had known that the Emperor Xerxes' chief of staff, by pressing a button somewhere in Asia Minor, a long way off, could obliterate, at one blow, not only the three hundred Spartans themselves, who were prepared and expecting to give their lives, but the whole community of Sparta—their wives and children, their fellow citizens, for whom they were giving their lives; that would have altered the situation. When the three hundred Spartans were chosen to give their lives at Thermopylae, only men who had living male children were chosen, the supposition being that those male children would survive in Sparta, would grow up to be soldiers in their turn, and would carry on the existence of Sparta. Suppose that the Spartan government had known that not only the three hundred men whom they were sending to die, but the little boys whom these men were leaving behind them, and all other

members of their families, would be obliterated in the same stroke—would it have made sense to send the three hundred to die?

I am suggesting that the traditional motive for a soldier's giving his life has now been removed. Then, in the past, it was correctly thought to be much better to be victorious than to be defeated in a war, because the defeated suffered things that the victors imposed upon them. The victors won territory, they won loot, they won honour and prestige. It looks to-day as if the atomic weapon were going to obliterate the distinction between victors and vanquished. At the end of an atomic war, it might be difficult to say who were the victors and who were the vanquished. That, again, removes—destroys—one of the traditional presuppositions of war. These two changes alone, taken together, have, I think, changed the character of this traditional institution of war out of all recognition. And I think this must mean that the time has come for us to reconsider our attitude towards war. When the whole situation of an institution changes, then the institution itself comes into question.

But it is easy to say: Change your attitude towards war—abolish war. If one puts that objective before oneself, one has to ask: What, if any, alternative might there be to a Third World War in the future? An atomic war would, no doubt, result in war being temporarily abolished by the annihilation of all the contending parties, and, if anything survived at all, by the imposition, on the ruins, of some kind of world government.

Is it possible for the United States and the Soviet Union—for the Liberal part of the World and the Communist part of the World—to manage to live side by side with each other? Can they accommodate themselves to that very awkward situation on this rapidly shrinking surface of the one planet on which we all live—for the size of the planet is rapidly shrinking as we go on rapidly increasing the speed of our means of communication? Is it possible for us to live side by side, strongly objecting to one another as we do, on the surface of the same shrinking planet, for an indefinite time to come? And the time for which we have to look forward to living side by side in this very awkward and uncomfortable way has to be indefinite. At present we cannot foresee a date at which the two parties will voluntarily combine to bring atomic weapons under the control of some single world-wide authority. That, I suppose, is the only ultimate solution for mankind now that we possess immensely destructive weapons. I think we are bound in the end—if we do not destroy ourselves—to put that weapon into the hands of some single world-wide authority. But, looking at the World as it is, divided into two camps, we know that that stage is to-day very remote, because that can only come out of mutual confidence and, unhappily, at present we have not that mutual confidence in each other. Meanwhile, these two camps are being brought physically closer and closer to one another by this triumph of

technology which—when it is applied to means of communication—we call ‘the annihilation of distance’.

I would say that, in our World to-day, the virtues that we most need to cultivate are, first, tolerance and then patience. By tolerance, I do not mean persuading oneself, or trying to persuade oneself, because that is convenient, that what I believe to be wrong may perhaps, after all, be right. What I mean by tolerance is putting up in public life—as we have to put up in private life—with neighbours whose conduct we strongly object to and disapprove of and whose intentions we distrust. In private life we are all of us—or many of us—in that situation. We have brothers or sisters or partners in business or neighbours whom we have to tolerate—though our relations with them may be very awkward, when there is a mutual dislike and distrust between us. In private life we do not suppose that we can solve such situations by cutting the knot. We cannot just knock on the head an awkward brother or sister or neighbour or business partner. And if we did this and then came before the Magistrate and said: “Of course, this was an impossible situation, so you will realise that I had to take very drastic action—and so I knocked her on the head,” we know that the judge would not regard that as an adequate defence. Now, what I am suggesting is that, in this respect, public affairs in our day are really comparable to private affairs. We are boxed up with one another on the surface of this shrinking planet till the distance between Russia and America is becoming really no greater than the distance in the past between members of the same family. So I believe we have now to exercise in our public life the tolerance that we have learned—or are taught by the law if we do not learn it by ourselves—to exercise in our private lives.

And here, I think, India may have a lesson to teach to the rest of the World. No doubt, it is easy for outsiders to point out blemishes in the civilization of India. But, in religion—and ultimately this question of tolerance is, I believe, a religious question—the Indian World is unlike the Christian-Jewish-Muslim World in having a much stronger tradition of tolerance. The Western religious tradition tends to be exclusive—to say that there is one way, one right way, one truth only. The Indians have the notion that there are more ways than one to the goal—more ways than one of attaining salvation. The West has something to learn, I think, from the Indians about that. The West, though it is losing its monopoly of power, still has a preponderance of responsibility. I think the West would do well to learn that Indian spiritual lesson.

Then—patience. I do not mean the kind of patience that is really another name for cowardice, for shrinking from cutting knots when knots ought to be cut. There are situations in life in which knots *should* be cut. But there are other situations in which it is wrong to take drastic action and necessary to be soft-handed. Looking back at the execution of King

Charles—that was the wrong solution for the constitutional question in England in the seventeenth century. There are situations in which it requires more fortitude and courage and endurance to be patient than to try to cut the knot in the hope that you will be able to rid yourself of the problem and to live happily ever after.

If we can learn patience and tolerance, I think there are some encouraging examples from past history to hearten us in continuing on this difficult course on which we find ourselves having to travel. I am thinking of the attitude that Christians and Muslims had towards one another in the Middle Ages, or Catholic Western Christians and Protestant Western Christians had towards one another in the seventeenth century. In both those situations, each party felt about the other party, I think, very much as people are feeling about each other in our World to-day under much more dangerous conditions. Their feeling was: life is going to be quite intolerable if that other party—that Muslim or that Christian society—continues to exist in the World side by side with us. Life will be intolerable for Protestants if Catholics continue to exist; and for Catholics if Protestants continue to exist. World wars were not so destructive then as now; and, in both cases, they fought a long series of wars in order to eliminate one another before they learnt from experience that this was impossible. Perhaps the duty of intolerance is their official doctrine still. Ask the authorities of the churches officially—ask the Catholic authorities and the Protestant authorities—if they ought to tolerate other religious bodies. Possibly the official answer might still be: “No, we ought not to tolerate their existence; their existence is intolerable.” And yet, for some centuries, we have managed to exist side by side with each other and to live intermingled in the same cities and to forget that it has been our official doctrine that it is impossible for us to live with one another.

So let us aim, in our World to-day, at making the relations between the people of the Western World and the Communist World follow the same unsensational course, to the same undramatic denouement, as, happily, the relations between Christians and Muslims and the relations between Catholic Christians and Protestant Christians have followed in the past. Here is one lesson from history that might be very profitable to us if we could manage to learn it.

(2)

DEMOCRACY IN THE ATOMIC AGE

I feel that I ought to begin by defining the two terms in my title. The Atomic Age and Democracy are both what Lewis Carroll calls 'portmanteau words'. These are convenient in a title, but, when one comes to talk on the subject indicated in the title, the first thing to do is to unpack these two portmanteaux and to spread out their contents. The contents of both terms are quite extensive.

The Atomic Age signifies, in our minds, not just the intellectual discovery of the structure of the Atom, and not just the technological discovery of a device for splitting an atom. The term suggests, as well, the sharp acceleration of a technological revolution in the Western World that has been gathering speed since the eighteenth century, and of a scientific revolution that has been gathering speed since the seventeenth century. But this is not the most characteristic part of the meaning that these words 'the Atomic Age' have for us in this room to-day. The rising speed of current scientific and technological discovery gives us less sense of elation than of apprehension. When we say 'the Atomic Age', we are conscious that this new age that has already overtaken us has overlapped in time with another age which is an old age—'the War-Making Age'—that we have not yet managed to leave behind. Mankind has afflicted itself with wars ever since the rise of the earliest of the civilisations about 5000 years ago, first gave human societies the surplus of resources and the powers of organisation without which the institution of War could never have come into existence. War, like slavery and like social injustice short of slavery, is one of the specific occupational diseases of Civilisation. We have practically cured ourselves of slavery within the last hundred years, and within the last forty or fifty years we have made a promising beginning in at least alleviating the other, less flagrant, forms of social injustice. But we have been signally defeated in our attempts, during our lifetime, to cure ourselves of the disease of War; and we have not even succeeded in alleviating the effects of this terrible social disease, which has been the death of so many civilisations in the past. The effects of War have lately been enormously aggravated by the recent acceleration of the pace of scientific and technological discovery; and, with the discovery of the means of manufacturing atomic bombs, we have acquired a weapon of war with which we might be able to annihilate ourselves in the full literal meaning of the verb. We have made this invention while the institution of War is 'still a going concern. This overlap in time between 'the War-Making Age'

and 'the Atomic Age' is the feature of 'the Atomic Age' that looms largest in all our minds, though this feature is not directly referred to in those three words.

Democracy to-day is, like Science, a charismatic or sacramental or at any rate talismanic word. In our present Westernising World there is no community that feels that it can afford to admit that it does not believe in, and does not practise, both 'Democracy' and 'Science'. To admit that one was 'undemocratic' or 'unscientific'—or, still more shocking, 'anti-democratic' or 'anti-scientific'—would be to admit that one was beyond the pale of Civilisation. This common lip-service to 'Democracy' and 'Science' is not worthy because it really is universal in the World to-day. It is something on which Capitalists and Communists, Westerners and non-Westerners, speak with one voice—I say advisedly 'speak with one voice'; I am not, of course, meaning by this that they act with one accord in their diverse ways of translating our common talismanic word 'Democracy' from utterance into practice.

Taken literally, the word 'Democracy' would mean an effective control of human affairs by the mass of Mankind. This is an ideal that has seldom or never been attained in practice. It will have come nearest to attainment in the West in some of the forest cantons of Switzerland in the Middle Ages, and in Greece in some of the highland city-states of Arcadia before the time of Alexander the Great. Perhaps, though, the complete achievement of Democracy in this literal sense may prove to be something beyond the powers of human nature. If so, this would be a very important point of difference between Democracy and Oligarchy—the rule of a minority—which has been the usual form of government *de facto*, even in communities that have professed themselves to be democracies and that have abominated Oligarchy in theory.

Theoretical democracies, as well as theoretical oligarchies, have usually been oligarchies *de facto* because it is difficult—indeed, perhaps impossible—for the mass of Mankind to exercise an effective political power by direct action. When and where the masses have won for themselves some measure of political power, they have usually achieved this by putting themselves in the hands of a politically competent minority which has professed to act as Demos's agents but which has seldom completely resisted the temptation to abuse its trust to some extent by pursuing its own minoritarian interests at the mass's expense.

But have not the scientific and technological achievements of the Atomic Age now at last made a direct form of Democracy a practical possibility on the grand scale, even on a world-wide scale?

In days before the recent invention of rapid mechanical means of transportation and of communication, by sight and by sound, over long distances without any physical displacement of the communicating human

bodies, the largest state in which a direct form of Democracy was a physical possibility was a state in which no part of the national territory was farther away than a single day's journey on foot from the place in which public business was transacted. Attica, within the historical frontiers of the city-state of Athens, was just not too large to fulfil this condition. The territory of the Roman Republic had become too large to fulfil the condition before the end of the fourth century B.C., and this is one of the explanations of the failure of the third-century attempt to make direct Democracy the basis of the constitution of the Roman Republic.

But in A.D. 1956, thanks to railroads, aeroplanes, broadcasting and television, the United States is a smaller country than Attica was in, say 444 B.C. in terms of human political geography. This year, the electorate in the United States will be more intimately and more continuously in touch with the candidates for the Presidency during the two party conventions and during the subsequent presidential election campaign than, in 444 B.C., an Eleusinian or a Marathonian farmer could be with Pericles or than Pericles could be with them. Does not this mean that direct Democracy has at last become practical politics in our mechanised world in our Atomic Age?

If the problem of establishing a genuine and effective form of direct Democracy had in truth been simply and solely a physical problem, then certainly the answer would be that, in our World now, direct Democracy had become a practical possibility. But we have to ask ourselves the question: 'Was direct Democracy a reality in the Attica of the fifth century B.C., where the necessary physical conditions were secured, not by 'the annihilation of distance' through mechanical inventions, but by the limitation of distance through the narrowness of the limits of the national territory?' We have only to put this question in order to realise that the answer is most emphatically in the negative. The physical possibility, open to the Attic farmer, of walking in one day from his cottage at Eleusis or at Marathon to the Pnyx at Athens did not automatically endow that Attic farmer with the political capacity to judge wisely between the policies proposed to him by Pericles and those proposed to him by Cimon or by Thucydides son of Melesias, or even between the policies proposed to him by Cleon and by Nicias. Our conclusion must be that, while direct Democracy cannot be made to work unless there is the physical possibility of personal contact between the electorate and the politicians, this physical condition for direct Democracy is merely an enabling condition. It will not, in itself, have the necessary virtue to ensure that the voters will make an effective use of the political rights that have now been brought physically within their reach. The physical possibilities, while indispensable, are not enough by themselves. The positive condition for the effective working of direct Democracy is that a majority of the voters should have political judgment, and political judgment requires

moral qualities as well as intellectual capacities. It will be seen that this dependence of Democracy upon judgment applies not merely to direct Democracy but to representative Democracy too.

In our Western World in this Atomic Age, is the intellectual judgment, necessary for making Democracy work, within the reach of the voters? The answer to this question was 'yes' in the postulate (tacit, because taken for granted) that was the invisible basis of the Constitution of the United States and of the Reform Bill of A.D. 1832 in the United Kingdom. This postulate was two-fold: that the business of government was simple enough for any adult citizen of ordinary intelligence, education, and experience of life to be able to grasp it; and that the electorate ought to be confined to adults who did fulfil these not very exacting human qualifications. Perhaps neither of the two conditions of this postulate was ever really fulfilled. In any case, within the last century both conditions have been sensationally violated by the course of historical events. On the one hand, public affairs have become immensely complicated as a result of the self-same mechanisation of life that has created the physical conditions necessary for direct Democracy. At the same time, the electorate has been vastly increased and diluted by the introduction of adult suffrage and by the nominal adoption of Western parliamentary representative political institutions in a large number of semi-Western and non-Western countries that have been brought within the bounds of an expanding Western World through the physical 'annihilation of distance' by Western mechanical inventions. In many of these nominally democratised non-western countries, not even the tiniest minority of the adult population has any background of political knowledge or experience. Thus the World's electorate has been diluted with an overwhelming majority of ignorant, incompetent, and helpless voters at a time when public affairs have become much more difficult to understand, and when political mistakes have become far more serious than they ever were in the past owing to the unprecedentedly powerful physical driving force that has been put into political action by the invention of atomic weapons.

In the working of the local political constitution of my own country, the United Kingdom, one can measure the degree in which the nineteenth-century premises have now ceased to hold good by looking at what has happened to two of the nineteenth-century British 'arcana imperii': the parliamentary question and the administration of the income-tax by the income-tax payers.

To-day the institution of the parliamentary question is still producing all its perhaps inevitable unfortunate effects on the state of mind and on the behaviour of civil servants. Any outsider, working as a temporary United Kingdom civil servant in war-time in our generation, will have been appalled to discover the extent to which administrative decisions are determined, not by the answer to the question 'Will this or that alternative

course be the better course on its merits?', but by the answer to the question 'Will this or that alternative course be the less likely course to lay us open to awkward parliamentary questions?' On the other hand, this institution, which is still having this unfortunate effect on public administration in the United Kingdom, has now largely ceased to perform the politically wholesome function which is its intended purpose. The wholesome function of the parliamentary question is, of course, to enable the electorate, through its elected representatives in Parliament, to exercise some control over the professional civil service; and, as an instrument for this important democratic purpose, the parliamentary question has broken down in the United Kingdom. It has broken down, not because the civil servants have become less prompt or less conscientious than they used to be in answering parliamentary questions, but because public business has become so complicated and so technical that it has become almost impossible for M.P.'s to know what are the right questions to ask.

That necessary knowledge will be in existence, nowadays, nowhere except in the minds of perhaps rather junior civil servants who are doing whole-time professional work in that particular pigeon-hole; and even they will not really know the answers, because the questions that are really important are those that take cognisance, not just of one or two pigeon-holes, but of the whole pigeon-cote. To-day, when the pigeon-cote of public administration has grown to the dimensions of the Pentagon at Washington, there may be nobody at all who knows the answers to the broad and big and therefore crucial questions. The Minister officially in charge of the department certainly will not know the answers, and they will probably be unknown even to the Department's permanent professional head. Moreover, even if the minimum relevant answer to a pertinent parliamentary question could be got out by a co-operative effort of all the civil servants concerned, this would probably run to the length of a blue-book of six or seven hundred pages; and, however ably indexed and annotated this blue book might be, its contents could not be grasped without devoting months or years of expert study to this one job. The complete answer to a parliamentary question would thus, under present conditions, obscure the truth, not by dishonestly trying to conceal it, but by honestly trying to expound it. It would hide the truth, not in darkness, but in a dazzling blaze of light.

What has happened to the administration of the United Kingdom Income-Tax is another illustration of the same point. The Income-Tax Commissioners are still nominally the representatives of the income-tax payers and not of the government, but actually the complication of income-tax law and practice—inevitably reflecting the complication of economic and financial life—has become so great that, on both the Government's side and the tax-payers' side, the levying of the income-tax has come to be a professional arena for chronic intellectual warfare between two great

armies of legal experts. One of the worst of the social and economic effects of the operation of the Income-Tax in the United Kingdom to-day is that it has withdrawn so many of the ablest minds in the country from productive and creative work, in order to employ them in this barren field.

The electorate in the United Kingdom to-day is, I suppose, one of the most mature sections of the vast electorate of the World. Therefore, if, even in the United Kingdom, public affairs have got out of the electorate's control to this extent, we can infer that, in the World as a whole, this political evil is likely to have gone to even greater lengths. Moreover, so far we have been considering only the inadequacy of the electorate's intellectual judgment to cope with the complication of public affairs. What about the inadequacy of its moral judgment, which is one of the deadly weaknesses of Democracy even in social milieux in which public affairs are comparatively simple?

One of the postulates of the political ideal of Democracy is that the individual voter is, not merely intelligent, but also disinterested. He is deemed, not merely to be able to see what is the better course, but also to be able to make himself able to wish for, and to vote for, what is the better course, even when he feels this to be against his own personal interests. In other words, the voter in a democracy is deemed to be, not merely something of a sage, but also something of a saint. He is deemed to have made an effective spiritual conquest over his own Original Sin. Yet how many voters in any community have really achieved that? Original Sin is no respecter of Civilisation. It dominates a self-styled 'civilised man' as formidably as it dominates those other men whom the would-be civilised man styles 'backward' or 'primitive' or 'savage'. The fifth-century Athenians were intelligent and educated and civilised; yet they allowed themselves to be won over by Pericles' appeal to their self-interest as against his opponent Thucydides' appeal to their conscience. Can we twentieth-century Westerners boast ourselves to be morally superior to the Athenians? I think not. This moral consideration brings out what is perhaps the most fundamental, and the most serious, of all the weaknesses in the political ideal of Democracy. This ideal assumes that ordinary adult human beings have the virtue to choose what is best as well as the intelligence to see what is best. This assumption is surely far more remote from the truth about politics than the traditional Christian doctrine that government is a social evil which is one of the inevitable penalties of Man's Original Sin.

But is not there one powerful counteracting force, on the side of the angels, in which we may reasonably place some hope? Granting it to be true that the simultaneous dilution of the electorate and complication of public affairs are adverse to the successful working of Democracy, is not the spread of Education favourable to Democracy? Education, after all, is much more than the learning of facts; it is also a moral training for

life. Is not Education, in this wider and deeper sense, coming to Democracy's rescue? The answer to this question is that, in those countries that are socially mature by comparison with some other parts of the World, Education undoubtedly has appreciably improved the prospects for Democracy within our own lifetime. We can measure this improvement by the notable and welcome decline in the power of the Press over public feeling and opinion since the First World War. And such symptoms in the socially more advanced countries are certainly encouraging as far as they go. But before we allow our hearts to leap up, we have to ask two questions: First, just how far has education gone, even in those few countries, to make good the damage that has been done to Democracy by the dilution of the Electorate and by the complication of public affairs? In the second place, can Education be expected to have any appreciable effect, within any foreseeable time, in making anything like a genuine Democracy possible in the greater part of the World? After all, even within the Western World, which includes only about one fifth of the living generation of Mankind, most of the eastern and southern countries of Western Europe have conspicuously failed to make a success of Democracy. Our Modern Western Parliamentary Democracy is a flourishing plant only in North-Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand.

What, then, can one expect of Democracy in the Atomic Age? I would suggest that we can expect it, even allowing for all its intellectual and moral shortcomings, to achieve two things: to make governments—including not only local governments but a future world government—aware of the limits beyond which they cannot flout Demos's will with impunity; and also occasionally to secure the coming into power of one of two alternative regimes in preference to the other. After all, these two things have been more or less effectively achieved in communities which we do not usually think of as having been democracies in any sense. In China, for example, where governments have traditionally had what seems, to an Englishman, like a very long rope, the Chinese people have again and again shown the power to pull their governments up short when those governments have tried to go beyond a certain—to our minds, perhaps, already inordinate—length. In China, again, public opinion has repeatedly tipped the balance in favour of a new regime, and in the Roman Empire and in the Arab Caliphate, too, it achieved this at least once: in the Arab Caliphate when the people opted for the Abbasid regime against the Umayyad regime; in the Roman Empire when they opted for Dioclotian's regime against the spirit of the preceding Augustan principate.

In asserting its will on those two occasions, what was Demos aiming at? Not at a positive goal, but at a negative one; not at taking the government into its own hand, but at having the government taken out of the hands of an oligarchy which, in the opinion of the masses, had been mis-using its monopoly of political power too flagrantly in order to promote

its own minoritarian interests. In the Roman Empire in the third century of our era and in the Arab Caliphate in the eighth century, public opinion supported a new regime that was more autocratic and more bureaucratic than the previous regime, because this new regime stood for Democracy, not in the positive sense of self-government, but in the negative sense of equality—of the abolition of privilege. These two historical precedents are interesting for us in our world to-day, because the abolition of privilege and establishment of equality is an aim which, in our world too, the masses manifestly do have at heart, and which, within our own lifetime, has been carried a long way toward realisation. In the domestic life of the politically maturer countries, we have lived to see a revolutionary reduction in the degree of class privilege. In the life of the World as a whole, we have lived to see a no less revolutionary reduction of the ascendancy of the former imperial Powers of Western Europe over their former subjects in Asia and Africa. As symbols of this tide in current human affairs that is running so strongly towards Democracy in the negative sense of equality, we may take the evolution of taxation in the United Kingdom since 1914 and the attainment of national independence by Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, and the Indian Union in 1947. These developments within the British Commonwealth are characteristics of contemporary tendencies throughout the World.

If it is broadly true that people are apt to win what they have set their hearts on, then, in the chapter of history on which we are now entering, we may expect to see greater progress towards Democracy in the sense of social equality than towards Democracy in the sense of political self-government. We might even once again, as in the past, see the masses consciously turning against the ideal of self-government, on the reckoning that, in the very nature of things, the institutions of self-government always play into the hands of a self-interested minority, and that the interests of the majority can be effectively looked after only by an autocratic-bureaucratic regime which is the natural ally of the masses because nothing but an alliance between the masses and this form of dictatorship can prevent political and economic power from gravitating into a privileged minority's hands. A bureaucracy too will, of course, be a privileged minority of a kind, but it might appear to be one which, unlike a middle-class parliamentary regime, can only keep itself in power by retaining the sympathy and support of the mass of the people, and which must therefore be more concerned to look after the interests of the masses than any other kind of ruling minority would be. This autocratic bureaucratic vein in the political regime of the Atomic Age seems paternal and liberating from the masses' point of view, but from the former ruling minority's point of view it will seem despotic and restrictive. Will the flow of the social tide in this direction be vigorously resisted by the middle class? There might have been vigorous middle-class resistance to it if the society in which we are living had been more or less secure against destruction

by war; but in an Atomic Age this destruction is feared, and reasonably feared, by the whole living generation without distinction of class, race, or civilisation; and no security against this danger is offered by our traditional Western parliamentary institutions within their existing framework. For this existing framework is not a world-state in which the control of atomic weapons is monopolised by a single government; it is a chaos of local sovereign independent states which are still free to make atomic war on one another. Therefore everybody's fear of atomic warfare, as well as the great majority of Mankind's desire for social equality, is a psychological force making for the rise of a centralised bureaucratic world government.

This suggests that individual personality may have an important part to play in this next chapter of the World's history. Franklin Roosevelt's and Winston Churchill's careers are perhaps a sign of the times. I will confess that I cannot see how our World is going to come through this Atomic Age without committing suicide unless Mankind does allow the helm to be taken by statesmen of the quality of those who have come to the World's rescue in similar crises in the past. I am thinking primarily of three figures—Han Liu Pang, the second founder of the Chinese Empire, Augustus and Mu'awiyah, the true founder of the Arab Caliphate—and I am thinking of four qualities: vision, moderation, patience, and persistence. Since Mankind is not going to commit suicide deliberately, I fancy that we shall give a rather free hand to some new Mu'awiyah or Augustus or Han Liu Pang. I know very well, of course, that I am suggesting something that is rather unorthodox in a community that has a deeply ingrained parliamentary tradition. So I will conclude by trying to expound and defend my thesis. I will take, one by one, the four qualities of statesmanship that I have just mentioned and will argue that there is no reasonable prospect that Demos, unassisted by forceful personalities in high places, will be able to develop these indispensable qualities to the degree, and at the speed, that are necessary if our present, obviously very hazardous, situation is to be saved. I will also argue that the three historic statesmen whom I have mentioned represent, between them, the kind of statesman that we need to have in charge of the World in our time too.

First, then, the quality of vision. Our World will not be saved from catastrophe unless it is in the hands of statesmen who see at least three things: first, that, now that human beings are armed with the edged tools that we hold in our hands to-day, our present host of local sovereign states have to be deprived of their sovereignty effectively and quickly; second, that the industrial working class in Western countries, and all classes in non-Western countries, have quickly and effectively to be raised to a social equality with the Western middle class; third, that, if and when a supreme effort of statesmanship has abolished war and has reduced social inequality to a degree at which it is no longer intolerable, the combined effect of these two indispensable reforms will be immediately to raise, in an acute

form and over a world-wide range, Malthus's problem of the pressure of population on the means of subsistence. I do not believe that the World electorate has the vision to make any of these three enormous re-adjustments of outlook except under commanding leadership. But there certainly have been statesmen in the past who have had this degree of vision.

The second quality needed is moderation. The quality of vision may be found in a wicked dictator like Hitler or in a ruthless dictator like Ts'in She Hwang-ti or in an impatient dictator like Julius Caesar. But in order to translate vision into successful action, your leader must have the moderation that was characteristic of all the three statesmen that I have singled out: Mu'awiyah, Han Liu Pang, and Augustus. All these commanded, and practised, the arts of 'hastening slowly' and of 'saving face'. Heaven knows, they, too, had to move at high speed and to go against the grain of deep-rooted habits and prejudices; but they did understand the nature of the human animal with which a statesman has to deal—that camel-like, mule-like, goat-like human nature that cannot be coerced, beyond a certain degree, without being made to turn mutinous and so to defeat its driver's object—a creature that is more easily led than driven. The immediate collapse of the houses that Hitler and Ts'in She Hwang-ti and Julius Caesar built is mainly accounted for by their common lack of the saving quality of moderation that Mu'awiyah and Han Liu Pang and Augustus all alike displayed in so high a degree.

The third necessary quality is patience: a capacity to suffer feels gladly and to do this with gusto, not as a martyrdom, but as a fine art which the practitioner can practise with zest. The importance of this gift is illustrated by the disastrous effects of the lack of it on the careers of two modern American statesmen: the former Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, and the late President Woodrow Wilson. Here we have had two Western statesmen of great vision and great intellectual power in key positions, who have not succeeded in making full use of their great political opportunities. And why? Because both of them found it excruciating to have to try to carry with them the barbarians—I mean, the senators and the press men. This part of their job excruciated them so much that they could not conceal it; and so they gave deep offence and aroused a crippling personal opposition. Now, just contrast, on this point of patience and affability, the performance of David Lloyd George or Franklin Roosevelt or Mu'awiyah. Though these three statesmen had virtually dictatorial powers, all three thoroughly enjoyed exercising the art of jolly along the fools and barbarians whose constant co-operation was indispensable for the success of their policy. The East Roman Emperor Alexius I's handling of the Crusaders, as described by his daughter Anna, is another classical example of the exercise of the same gift. In Arabic there is a special word—*Hilm*—which exactly denotes this gift. *Hilm*—a long-suffering, because congenial affability—was the quality of statesmanship

in which Mu'awiyah was preeminent. A statesman commissioned to put the World in order must be *halim*, as well as moderate and discerning, if he is to make a success of his very difficult job.

The fourth necessary quality is persistence—the quality in which Stalin, for example, was conspicuously strong, and in which Hitler—with his erratic, spasmodic temperament—was, fortunately for the rest of us, most fatally weak. This quality of persistence was displayed in a high degree by all my three historic paragons, but most conspicuously, I should say, by Han Liu Pang.

I submit that, in the chapter of history on which we are entering now, these four qualities of statesmanship are indispensable in the World's rulers if those rulers are to pull the World through its present war crisis and are then to face up to the population-crisis that is looming up behind that. And I beg you to ask yourselves, very seriously, the disturbing question: Are those qualities likely to be forthcoming, in the necessary measure and within the necessary time, in our world electorate, which now includes the electorates of the Gold Coast and Nigeria, as well as the electorates of Denmark and New Zealand? If we find that we cannot answer this question honestly in the affirmative, then, I suggest, we must face the necessity of calling in statesmanship, invested with almost plenary authority, to the aid of Democracy in this crisis—notwithstanding the well-known drawbacks and dangers that even the least undesirable kind of authoritarian regime always brings with it. After all, everything in this World has its price; and, for Democracy in the Atomic Age, the price of salvation is surely bound to be very high.

(3)

THE BALANCE SHEET OF EMANCIPATION

We are conscious of living in a revolutionary age. For instance we are aware of living through a revolution in the nature of war, and through another revolution in the relation between different civilizations and religions. In the past, they each lived more or less in isolation, leading separate lives; to-day they find themselves thrown together in one world, and are having to learn to live in close contact with each other. These are two great contemporary revolutions; but perhaps the greatest of all is the emancipation of Mankind in the mass.

During the five thousand years that have passed between the dawn of Civilization and our own time, Civilization, so far, has always been oligarchic, not democratic, in its constitution. It has been created, maintained, and advanced by a small minority of the members of Society, and, in return for the service that it has performed for Society at large, this minority—and also its less deserving descendants—have enjoyed privileges. They have had a monopoly of power and have taken advantage of this to monopolise the amenities of life—not only leisure (which is one of the sources of power, besides one of its rewards) but also luxuries.

Till the Industrial Revolution these amenities were bound to be monopolised by *some* minority, because, till then, even the most efficient and fortunate society was not capable of producing the amenities in sufficient quantities to provide for everybody. But the old regime of privilege lasted on for at least 150 years after the Industrial Revolution had got under way. This was still, in reality, the regime of the nineteenth-century Western World, though nineteenth-century Westerners—especially if they happened to be citizens of the United States—thought of themselves as living in a democratic age. In reality, down to 1914 the affairs of the whole World were still being managed by a small minority of upperclass and middle-class males in half-a-dozen European capital cities and in New York and Washington. Even the wives, sisters, and mothers of this middle-class Western male oligarchy did not share in the management of affairs officially, though no doubt they exercised considerable power *sub rosa*. Nearly all the women in the World, nearly all the Western industrial working class, and nearly the whole of the peasantry of Asia, Africa, and the Middle American and Andean countries were passive members of society. They 'did not count'. They had to do as they were told.

In our time, we have been witnessing the emancipation of the industrial workers, the women, the peasantry. The industrial workers have

first obtained effective political power, and then a much greater share in the economic rewards of their work. The women have not only obtained the vote; they have entered trades and professions that used to be monopolised by men (the greater physical strength which used to give men an advantage over women has now been largely counteracted by the mechanisation of the World's work, and a large part of this mechanised work has passed into the women's hands). Even the peasantry, who till lately have been living on a standard only just above the starvation level, have now begun to awake to the possibility of enjoying a better life. And the peasantry—men, women, and children together—still amount to-day to about three-quarters of Mankind.

This wholesale emancipation of Mankind is not only a great revolution; it is also a good one *if* we succeed in coping with the problems that it creates. It is good because the traditional inequality in the distribution of power, wealth, and leisure has been morally wrong and has also been a cause of social instability—as is witnessed by the turbulence of the course of history from the dawn of Civilization till now. But, if we fail to cope with the problems created by emancipation, this revolution will be illusory—or, rather, it will produce the opposite of the effect that is desired by those who are making it. The result will be, not more social justice, but less; not less turbulence, but more.

For thousands of years the great unemancipated majority of Mankind has put up patiently with conditions of life that the privileged minority would have found intolerable. To-day, everyone who has had a taste of emancipation, or who has awoken to the possibility that he might have a taste of it, has become impatient of delay. He wants to see himself, his class, his nation, completely emancipated within his own lifetime. This is human, because a human being has only his own single lifetime for attaining and enjoying anything for himself. At the same time this impatience is very awkward, because a single lifetime is a very brief allowance of time for acquiring social experience. It takes, not just one life-time, but at least three generations, for a family effectively to change its social class, nationality, or religion. It takes still longer for the members of a society to make the transfer of their political loyalty from local states (e.g. city-states or nation-states) to a 'world empire' like the Roman Empire or the Chinese Empire. So one life-time is a very short measure of time for carrying through the process of emancipation from start to finish.

In this difficult psychological situation, the crux of the problem is to find the right pace. The pace must not be so slow as to make the majority demanding emancipation revolt against the minority in power; for, if once this happens, the breach is not easy to close, and the majority will lose all further chance of profiting by the minority's experience. On the other hand, the pace must not be so fast as to outrun the majority's power of effectively exercising the rights that are being nominally conferred on

them. Rights cannot be exercised effectively unless one has acquired the necessary amount of experience, and rights that one cannot exercise effectively are illusory. Worse than that, they will be exercised, in their nominal possessor's name, by some adventurer: a demagogue or a dictator. In fact, emancipation, when it is merely on paper, is not genuine emancipation; it is just a fine-sounding name for a change of masters.

Sometimes the people who are being offered emancipation appreciate this point. The Southern Sudanese, for instance, seem to have realised that, in their present state of political immaturity, their emancipation from British rule means their subjection to Northern Sudanese rule. Often, however, people who are impatient for emancipation do not take this point till it is too late to slow the pace of emancipation down.

In the past, the distribution of power and wealth between a ruling minority and a subject majority has been very unequal and this inequality has been unjust. But, at this price—and, of course, it is a high price—the World's affairs have been comparatively easy to manage. This has been easy because the number of people concerned in the management has been small, and this small ruling minority has possessed considerable experience.

In our time, a far larger fraction of the World's population has won a voice in the World's affairs. There are now many more self-governing countries than there used to be, and, in each country, there are more voters and more members of trades unions. In the long run, national self-government, and democracy within each national state, seems likely to prove a more stable political system than the traditional system of government by a privileged minority. The new system will have a wider basis of consent. But the price of this is a greater number of voices than can have a say without possessing the necessary experience; and, in the short run, this makes the World's affairs more difficult to manage. It is more difficult to make things work by giving advice than by issuing orders, and it is especially difficult when the people whom one is advising have the power to reject good advice without having the experience that would have made them able to understand that the advice is good and that it would be a mistake not to take it.

Trying to make things work under the new conditions is thus more difficult than it was under the old conditions. It makes greater demands on human nature on both sides: on our intelligence, on our patience, on our capacity for mutual forbearance. Buying wisdom through experience is likely to be costly when the experience has to be acquired after emancipation, not before it, and in a World where everyone is equipped with high-powered tools and weapons. The British and French middle class acquired their experience before emancipation, in the service of the upper class while the upper class was still in power. Also, they were emancipated at a date when the present technological revolution was still in its early

stages, and when it was therefore still possible for people to make mistakes and commit follies without incurring mortally severe penalties.

In the past, Society has always had reserves of manpower (the barbarian beyond the frontiers) and woman-power (the wife and mother and unmarried daughter and maiden aunt in the home). Society could, and did, draw on these reserves when the men in power failed to rise to the occasion or played the fool. The barbarians stepped into the breach after the collapse of the Roman Empire and the Chinese Empire. The women stepped into the breach in the southern states of the United States after the defeat of the Confederacy in the Civil War. To-day we are approaching a time when there will be no more barbarians; the last surviving barbarians are being absorbed rapidly into our new world-wide industrial society. We may also be approaching a time when there will be few women not employed, at least part-time, outside the home on jobs which used to be exclusively man's work or on jobs of new kinds which did not exist before women took them on.

Of course, this tendency for women to go out of the home in order to take a hand in the World's work is being offset to some extent by a counter-tendency for men to take a greater part in domestic work and in bringing up the children. A European observer is struck by this tendency in the United States, but it can also be observed in other parts of the World. In the long run, this sharing in the World's work by women and in domestic work by men is going to be a good thing, because it is going to bring Mankind a long step nearer towards social justice as between the sexes. Meanwhile, during the time of transition and adaptation, both sexes are being put under a strain. It is, in fact, more taxing, as well as more stimulating and satisfying, to combine two different occupations than it is to concentrate on one. But, for men as well as women, this combination of managing the home with doing the World's work may turn out to be a timely antidote to the excessive specialization and division of labour which the mechanisation of the World's work has brought with it. Domestic work cannot be mechanised so easily. In fact, it is surely quite impossible to mechanise the bringing-up of one's children.

The reason why one cannot mechanise the bringing-up of children is, no doubt, because the relation between parents and children, like every relation between human beings, is largely a matter of feeling. Our feelings well up from the subconscious level of the Psyche; the subconscious has its own fixed pace; and if you try to drive it beyond this pace, it turns mulish and defeats you. By contrast, mechanisation is the fruit of Science; Science is a matter of intellect; and the intellect's pace is almost incomparably faster than the pace of the subconscious.

This swiftness of the intellect's pace accounts for the speed at which the emancipation of Mankind has been taking place in our time. Science has made emancipation possible by creating abundance and by annihilating

distance. It has made these revolutions in the material circumstances of human life very quickly and the social and spiritual movement towards emancipation has been moving at the same rate. But Man does not live by intellect alone; and, when his intellect goes full speed ahead, it is likely to land him in a disaster if the subconscious part of his Psyche is left too far behind in the race.

Here is the dilemma: Man's intellect can see, in a flash, to the end of the road of emancipation, and his will demands that the whole distance shall be traversed within the period of a single life-time. On the other hand, the subconscious requires perhaps as much as three consecutive life-times to complete the same journey. Can statesmanship hit upon a medium pace for the emancipation movement that will not be too fast for the subconscious, and not too slow for the intellect and the will? If it cannot, the outlook is formidable; if it can, then it may open up a new and happier stage in the history of Mankind.

Review Articles

WILL THEY REMAIN FOREIGNERS?—A review of W. D. Borrie's "*Italians and Germans in Australia*."¹

By W. L. Kovacs*

In view of the growing number of the representatives of foreign cultures in Australia who have settled permanently here, certainly there are bound to be many British-Australians having some uneasy questions on their mind. "Will they abandon their native culture? Will they change their loyalties? Is the progress of their adjustment to the environment fast enough, or will they remain foreigners for ever?"

Various people may have contrasting opinions; one thing is, however, quite certain: answers to these and similar questions can *not* be provided off-hand, nor will sweeping generalisations based on a few personal observations be satisfactory at all.

The task of finding a reply to inquiries of this kind should undoubtedly fall within the scope of the social sciences, on whose behalf in this case Borrie tries to break fresh ground with his volume under review. Indeed, it is disclosed in the Introduction (p. XIX) that

"this study can claim to be no more than a preliminary analysis of the assimilation process of two of the largest ethnic minorities in Australia. . . . This study may lay the basis for more extensive research . . . which can test the conclusions tentatively stated here."

The idea of writing such a book had originated at a meeting of the Unesco in 1950 when measures were taken to prepare a number of studies about assimilation of European ethnic groups. Borrie, Head of Department of Demography at The Australian National University, was asked to write a study of the assimilation of Italians and Germans in Australia. Although this study forms part of the foundation material of a synoptic volume to be published by the Unesco, the author has been permitted to publish the Australian study separately as well.

The study appears to have two principal aims. In the first place to provide a preliminary assimilational survey of Germans and Italians, ". . . determine what have been the points of stress between Australians and Germans and Italians, to ascertain why these stresses have existed

1. Borrie, Wilfred David, *Italians and Germans in Australia: A Study in Assimilation*, assisted by D. R. G. Packer. Published for The Australian National University, F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1954, pp. XX and 236, maps, diagrams, tables, index and bibliographical note.

* W. L. Kovacs (19 Mantell St., Moonce Ponds, W.4, Vic., is a graduate from Buda Pest who has been in Australia for seven years and has just submitted a thesis for M.A. at the University of Melbourne on the assimilation of migrants.

and to consider the nature of their development over time" (p. XIV), then—with the aid of the experience thus acquired—to draw up some guidance about contemporary intergroup problems.

The method chosen is essentially historical; thus the study depends in a large measure on secondary sources.¹ It would be, however, rash to assume that they were not fittingly balanced or rather exceeded by a multitude of primary material. The latter include in addition to substantial census, naturalization, demographic and other statistical records, questionnaires circulated in the schools of six Queensland shires, the result of a field-worker's visit to Italian settlements in the vicinity of two Queensland townships and an analysis of the pre-1917 German-language press.

The first part of the study analyses the Australian background. The second and most substantial part determines the general pattern of Italian settlement, then tests the tentative conclusions thus derived against field observations collected in concentrated Italian groups, and finally assumes that the conclusions are largely valid concerning most other Italian communities as well in Australia. The third part deals with the pattern of German settlement and the statistical, social and cultural aspects of the assimilation of German settlers. The fourth and last part sifts the (historical) conclusions of the previous parts, that are appropriate to be applied to contemporary immigrants and incorporates some predictions relating to the assimilation of recent settlers.

The observations and conclusions crystallized in this volume, concerning assimilation as a social, cultural and economic phenomenon, deserve perhaps the greatest attention. Some of these, of course, will have to be tested by future research; there may also be some revaluation of the choice made in the Introduction in completely discarding—as far as Australia is concerned—G. Mauco's definition that "assimilation consists in taking a free part in communal life on a footing of equality" (p. XIII).

Similarly some further thought may be required on the comprehensiveness of the provisional definition drafted at the Unesco meeting of demographers in 1950 that

"Assimilation is a psychological, socio-economic and cultural process resulting in the progressive attenuation of differences between the behaviour of immigrants and nationals within the social life of a given country" (p. XIV).

In the analysis of the 'Australian background' the most significant observation seems to be that the immigrants were primarily scrutinized to see if they were able to sustain the existing standard of living and judged "... secondly by their ability, through similarity in language, social, political and religious customs, to conform quickly to what Australians felt to be a national way of life" (p. 21).

There was a general assumption that northern Europeans could and would come up more to these expectations than southern Europeans.

However, it is argued by Borrie, "... the strength of the opposition to any European national or ethnic group at selected points of time can be shown to have been primarily a function of economic factors" (p. 22).

By the same token a more comprehensive analysis of the immigrants' economic, social and cultural background would appear extremely relevant here; an analysis which would secure an insight into patterns prevailing at the time of the emigration in the newcomers' countries of origin.

A striking quality of almost every immigrant group appears to be its unbalanced sex ratio. This has applied also to Australia and was not restricted to newcomers from continental Europe alone. As late as 1891 the census revealed that in the Australian population as a whole there were 86 females per 100 males but as few as 10 females for every 100 Norwegian and Swedish-born males.

One cannot but remember that a similar disproportion of the sexes may be noticed in the midst of the post-1945 immigrants, resulting (also according to many press reports) in a variety of social problems. Similar difficulties must have been the concomitants of the excessive masculinity ratio in the past, and future research on assimilation will in all probability benefit by their thorough examination.

Males far exceeded females among the Italian settlers of this country. The proportion between the sexes proved, however, much more favourable for the German immigrants particularly in South Australia in the pre-1850's. The number of females among them almost equalled that of the males (1389 females in 3030 German-born between 1846 and 1850). This circumstance, that is the reduced opportunity for inter-marriage with British-Australians, is seen as one of the main factors in the preservation for several generations of *Deutschtum* ('the German language, customs and culture') among many of the descendants of the one-time Lutheran refugees. German influx was also promoted by the gold-rushes. In 1891 the number of the German-born in Australia had reached almost 45,000 — in addition, of course, to the Australian-born children of the preceding settlers — still having the comparatively fortunate proportion of 53 females per 100 males.

Germans settled in all the six States, often as a result of internal migration. With the exception of South Australia and Queensland, where there still survive the rumps of some of the original German settlements, the other States have not — apart from small pockets of Germans here and there — any example of concentrated German communities. The greater success of some German groups in the above-mentioned two States in persisting in their German culture notwithstanding their full economic assimilation is explained, besides the favourable ratio between the sexes among the early German settlers, by environmental differences. Those settlers had come as pioneers in groups and remained in groups in regions little touched by civilisation, engaged in the same occupation, farming.

Their groups were apparently peasant-communities bound together by the traditions and customs of many centuries. A sociological examination of the available material might establish resemblance in some respects to the German peasant communities formerly scattered in many parts of eastern-central Europe, a number of which were known to have kept their language and culture for more than 500 years.

The German immigrants of this century, however, who could not find (in common with Italian and other non-British settlers) any more unalienated land and therefore dispersed into the towns, have been intermarrying with Australians. Between 1908 and 1940, for example, more than 80 per cent. of the German grooms married non-Germans and more than 60 per cent. of the German brides became the spouses of non-Germans.

The bulk of the Italian inflow having taken place mainly in the years after 1921 would be expected also to be of the 'dispersed' type. Nonetheless quite a substantial portion of it shows the characteristics of group settlement. The reasons offered for this include the tendency of Italian immigrants to gain their living in a narrow range of occupations, their familial or regional loyalty attracting and enabling additional migration to the same locality ('chain migration'), competition with organised Australian-born labour—especially in rural areas—which caused "unsympathetic and at times clearly hostile attitudes" towards Italians particularly when employment was scarce in the depression years of the 1930's.

A combination of economic opposition and

"a feeling of racial superiority (which was never apparent against the Germans) may have encouraged the Italians to remain socially and culturally segregated from the Australian community . . ." (p. 220).

This may suggest the likelihood that it was the social and cultural segregation that was mainly responsible, at least in the case of the unmarried males, for their returning to Italy to find themselves brides and thus strengthening their cultural ties with their native country—in contrast to the view expressed in the study that

"This movement to and from Italy also helps to explain why intermarriage with non-Italians remained slight compared with other ethnic groups" (p. 221).

At this juncture the question of 'institutions' as cultural preserving agents wants discussion.

Most of the early German settlers having the same religion (Lutheranism) were separated also in this way from the majority group. Pioneering in a new country they themselves had to adjust their pre-existing cultural and social patterns to the requirements of their new natural *milieu* alone. Therefore

"It was in the areas of group settlement that the cultural and social traits persisted most strongly, and the most powerful influence

encouraging this persistence was the Lutheran Church. From these centres also expanded the German-language press" (p. 193).

That Church is represented as having

"... a fervour born of schism which was seldom found in other Protestant settlements overseas. The Church was an important institution in the social, cultural and even political life of the people" (p. 195).

Particularly in South Australia and in Queensland was it perceived as a 'powerful factor militating against assimilation' by keeping alive *Deutschtum* through church services in German and maintaining German-language schooling.

Nevertheless, in view of recent sociological experience concerning the role of minority institutions in furnishing cultural and moral support for individuals and groups uprooted from their native society, the determination of the merits and demerits of churches and for that matter social clubs, associations and the foreign-language press in sustaining the native cultures within the minority groups may require additional investigation. In fact, Borrie's observation that

"The environment in which the Germans settled had no deep cultural roots and it was natural for them to cling to what they had. To cast off the habits and customs of their areas of origin would have created cultural vacuum" (p. 218),

may have a broader validity; it may bear relation to many first-generation members of other ethnic groups as well and even to the present. The significance and influence of minority institutions among immigrants, however, seem to be on the decline in comparison with the last century, affected presumably by the vigorous development since then of the cultural roots of the Australian environment.

This is borne out also by the evolution-pattern of the Italian groups. They are not 'closed' communities as the German ones used to be; nor do they have to provide themselves educational facilities. Departmental and Roman Catholic schools are available where

"their children learn English, and while Italian may be the medium in the home, the bilingualism of the second generation will tend to break down relatively quickly the adherence to the language of origin" (p. 222).

Nor did the Italians bring any secular institutions which could have developed into

"a permanent focal point for the persistence of their national culture" (p. 152).

Their press was not regarded as strongly nationalistic.

There are few objective indices which could be employed for the measurement of the progress of assimilation. One frequent method is, of

course, the analysis of the applications for naturalization within an ethnic group. The examination in our study of such applications reveals—besides much other valuable material—that only a slight fraction of the German-born (in common with other nationalities) had applied at all for naturalization in the pre-1914 years; furthermore, it suggests

“... that naturalization is not of itself an adequate guide to the speed of assimilation of any minority. Rather is naturalization the final step which the free immigrant takes after he has accepted the social and cultural patterns of his country of adoption” (p. 121).

Certain fluctuations in the number of naturalizations reflect both the repercussions in Australia of international events, and the evolution of the demands of loyalty of the emerging national states.

An analysis in the volume of some products of the German-language press in the pre-1920's resulted in similar conclusions. Although

“the press maintained a very positive attitude towards Germany . . . the columns . . . reveal an earnest desire to have the best of both worlds—to be loyal to the new Germany and at the same time loyal to Australia . . . 1914 at least solved the dilemma for many, and between 1914 and 1918 the loyalty of the great majority of Germans was unquestioned” (p. 208).

At any rate the census of 1921 recorded more than four-fifths of the German-born as naturalized and in 1933 the position appeared substantially the same.

The scrutiny of the naturalization statistics of Italian settlers showed a very much different trend among them in the inter-war period. In 1933, for instance, about two-thirds of the Italian-born still adhered to their Italian nationality in spite of their having completed the residential requirements. By 1950, however, there were only about 10 per cent. who had not been naturalized, though entitled to do so.

It appears from the study that there existed some correlation between the desire to obtain naturalization (as a sort of rehabilitation) and the Australian apprehensions at pro-Fascist activities during the 1940's; a correlation which may have been like the one twenty years before in the case of the German-born, who had thought it advisable to prove their loyalty also in that manner. Incidentally, as regards Nazism, the volume does not have to say much beyond stating that

“Whilst there was fear amongst Australians after 1933 that Nazi propaganda would regain the enthusiasm of even these Australian-Germans for the Reich, this did not eventuate. . . . This propaganda found its main support in the cities, where the Nazis captured control of the German clubs, but it never seriously hindered the disintegration of *Deutschtum* in the group settlements founded in the nineteenth century” (p. 213).

Nevertheless, the fact that such a large majority of the first-generation Italians has obtained naturalization does not indicate complete social and cultural integration with the communities of their abodes. As the author expresses it:

"... field investigations show clearly that Italians retained many traits, particularly within the circle of the home, which were not 'Australian.' And naturalized or not they were still not fully accepted by Australians" (p. 141).

Evidently there exists some discrepancy in the meaning of 'naturalization' when applied to the German settlers of the last century and when to the more recent Italian applicants, indicating the extent to which changed circumstances may affect the accuracy of 'assimilation indices.' Yet, to conclude the discussion of 'naturalization,' another observation emerges that may be tested in the future: the inclination of non-British immigrants to become naturalized may be in inverse ratio to the current prestige at any selected time of their countries of origin in the opinion of their country of adoption.

In accordance with the principle laid down in the Introduction that "The process of assimilation in a situation in which the input of stock with cultures alien to that of the native population attains any considerable proportion is never a one-way process" (page XII), one would expect that, if only in places where the ethnic groups under discussion have, or had, constituted a considerable part of the total population some significant reminders of their presence there could be identified in the local cultural and social structure. Nevertheless, the study concludes that

"On the whole, the process of assimilation promises to be essentially a one-way process. Even in districts where the Italians formed a majority there were few signs that the attenuation of differences was occurring as a result of mutations in the Australian social and cultural pattern..." (p. 127).

But the fact that the Italian settlers were not quite completely assimilated is not seen as a likely cause of serious tension

"... so long as a situation of full employment exists" (p. 223).

This leads us now to Borrie's formulation of predictions which are based on the assimilational history of the two ethnic groups and may be related—in spite of the vast changes in the Australian environment—to contemporary immigrant groups. He regards as the safest conclusion in this respect the probability that the completion of the assimilational process would take more than a generation, or in other words naturalization is not necessarily tantamount to assimilation. The cultural persistence of a numerically small minority may not cause tension if (a) there exists no conflict with the majority group on economic grounds, (b) the country of origin of the ethnic minority does not conduct an internal or foreign policy injurious to the interests of the country of immigration.

Finally, a brief account is given of the Displaced Persons, as the largest contemporary immigrant group. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of it is the realization, implied rather than clearly expressed, that in recent years Australia has been deliberately changing into a multi-cultural society, and that decision has been accompanied by a novel assimilation policy, which is positive and determined yet greatly considerate.

Pioneering in any branch of sciences is obviously a very difficult task and, in this case, it has been rendered even harder by the infliction of dealing with a largely sociological topic preponderantly from the demographic and historical angles. In this connection it has to be pointed out, of course, that both demography and history should play a vital part in the study and understanding of the receiving society, minority groups and the assimilation processes generally, yet it is the utilisation of sociological experience which in many instances alone will elucidate apparently unconnected phenomena.

Even with the best of intentions slips of the pen are bound to occur — and they are brought up here in order to dispel misunderstanding rather than to attempt to detract from the intrinsic value of the study as a whole.

The figure that between the Federation (1901) and 1920 Australia's total net gain through migration amounted to about '282,000' (p. 9) should probably read '248,000'; it may have been arrived at by adding the *negative* increase of 16,793 of the years 1901-05 to the *positive* increase of the rest of the period.—There seem to be two errors in the following sentence on p. 10: "In 1949 157,700, and in 1950 174,500, permanent new arrivals reached Australia, among whom 98,900 and 105,200 were respectively British and non-British." The figure for '49 should be 167,727, while the figures 98,900 and 105,200 appear to be related to the non-British component of the permanent new arrivals in 1949 and 1950 respectively.—Some misapprehension might arise from the statement that "As Murphy has pointed out the experiences of these people in Europe has (!) created a Displaced Person psychology, but as time advances the migrants may recapture a sentimental attachment to their country of origin as they remember it in pre-war days" (p. 227). Borrie seems to imply that the Displaced Persons had lost "their sentimental attachment to their country of origin" so that they "may recapture it." The foundation for this implication, however, does not appear to be satisfactorily identifiable in Murphy's relevant study, nor can it presumably be borne out by facts. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to apply Borrie's pertinent wording from another of his essays: "Many of them have shared, whatever their nationality, their experience as Displaced Persons. But more important is the fact that many of them still look back with an intense loyalty towards their countries of origin as they knew these in pre-war days." ('New and Old Australians' in Aughterson, W.V., editor, *Taking Stock*, Melbourne, F. W. Cheshire, 1953, p. 183).

Looking through the volume once again it is quite obvious that it is the result of a great deal of work and research; it appears mostly well documented (perhaps more particulars of the questionnaires and the survey in Queensland might have been disclosed). The whole study abounds in penetrating observations and may be rightly regarded as a significant contribution towards the elucidation of the manifold problems and processes inherent in what is broadly described as 'assimilation of foreigners.'

Apparently some of the overseas scientific observers must have been impressed both by the importance and the urgency of several of the problems analysed in this volume. The recent decision of the trustees of the Nuffield Foundation to grant a comparatively large sum of money to The Australian National University to be expended on a survey of post-war immigrants in Australia under the direction of Mr. Borrie, is evidently connected with the merits of the present study.

TEN YEARS OF GERMANY UNDER OCCUPATION

By Dr. E. Bramsted

Few things are so difficult as seeing the immediate past, the last decade, in historical perspective. Not only personal preference and bias threaten to impair one's picture, but as far as foreign affairs are concerned, the essential government documents are usually not made available for a long time.

Nevertheless, in an age of comparatively "open" diplomacy, many diplomatic notes and memoranda are published at the time and there is now in addition a flood of official propaganda material, which the student of international affairs must search for the motives behind it.

In the case of post-war Germany statements issued first by the four big Allied powers and from 1949 onward also by the two rival German governments had frequently both an operational and a propaganda function. It is the combination of national and international aspects which makes the study of the ten years of Germany under occupation so interesting and so complicated. This becomes evident from the perusal of the 650 pages of documentation on Germany during that period, now made available by Chatham House.*

The editor, Miss B. R. von Oppen, had to translate much of the material, an onerous task not made easier by the new ideological jargon which has developed in the Russian controlled zone. New expressions appeared overnight to cover new institutions and concepts and old words have assumed a new meaning. The Russian influence is much more noticeable in these documents than that of the English and American terminology.

This is a useful and reliable volume. The material has been arranged chronologically with a lengthy Table of Documents divided according to years. Yet one might doubt if it was wise to dispense with chapter headings altogether. There are some obvious major incisions in the history of post-war Germany which might have been indicated. After a brief spell of co-operation between the four Occupying Powers in 1945-46, the economic and political systems set up in the three Western zones on the one hand and in the Russian zone on the other took on an increasingly different shape and by 1948 these differences had hardened under the icy impact of the "cold war". With the establishment of the German Federal Republic in Bonn and the German Democratic Republic in East Berlin

* *Documents on Germany under Occupation, 1945-1954*. Selected and edited by Beate Ruhm von Oppen. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 1955, Oxford University Press. £A4.10.9.

in autumn 1949 the fundamental post-war division had made permanent the split in Germany between the four members of the old Control Council. The last document in this volume issued by the Control Council is directive No. 54 of June 25, 1947 on basic principles for the democratization of education in Germany, yet the Soviet representative General Sokolovsy withdrew from the Council only on March 20, 1948. But whereas the three Western Powers changed over from Military Government to a much less rigid control by Occupation Statute with Allied High Commissioners taking the place of the Military Governors on September 21, 1949, the Russians followed suit after considerable delay; they transferred the functions of control over the East German State from the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces to a civilian Soviet High Commissioner as late as May 1953.

As far as the evolution of the Western German State was concerned, the year 1951 formed another important turning point on the road to full sovereignty. In March 1951 the German Federal Republic obtained control over foreign affairs, and Dr. Adenauer, who had been Chancellor since September 1949, became in addition the first Federal Foreign Minister. In July of the same year the Western Allies formally declared the state of war with Germany ended. Shortly before, in April 1951 the U.S.A. authorities had expressly recognised "the right of [Western] Germany to participate in her own and in the common defense within an integrated European defense system under conditions of equality." A new development had begun which was to reach its peak three and a half years later when the Nine Power Conference, assembled in London from September 28—October 3, 1954, invited the Federal Republic to accede to the Brussels Treaty. Soon afterwards Germany was admitted as a member of NATO. On May 5, 1955 the three Allied High Commissioners in Bonn issued their final proclamation by which the Occupation Statute came to an end and their own offices were dissolved. It is a pity that the text of this significant document has not been included in the volume.

As Mr. Alan Bullock points out in the preface, cuts in the selection from an overwhelming mass of material were inevitable in order to arrive at a manageable size for the book. But it is to be regretted that the omissions extended to the dispute between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union which culminated in the Berlin blockade of 1948. Anyone, who, like the present reviewer, was in Berlin during that crisis will know how much it affected the attitude of the Berliners, and how Mr. Bevin's firm stand leading to the air lift gained the West a good deal of sympathy among Germans there and in the Western zones.

It is perhaps an unavoidable limitation of a collection of this type that it has to concentrate on legal, economic and political documents and can only indirectly reflect changes in the mental climate. Of course, in the

Eastern zone the Statements issued by the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and by the various other Communist mass organisations express an ideological trend the counterpart of which in the West is much less explicit and thus much more difficult to illustrate.

It is significant that from the beginning party organisations played a much bigger role in the Soviet zone and that thus the principles and aims of its primary party, the SED, attained, as early as 1946, an importance which was never matched by the later major Government Party in the West, Dr. Adenauer's Christian Democrats. It was the SED that in July asked the Russian Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Sokolovski for an increase of rations and later thanked him warmly for granting it, praising the Marshal's Order as "a further proof of the magnanimity of the Soviet Occupying Power towards the German People." The SED was, of course, fully behind the drastic land reform introduced in the various Länder and Provinces of the Russian zone as early as September 1945. This splitting up of the big Junker estates and their parcellation for the benefit of thousands of small-scale farmers remained without a counterpart in the West.

Many of these documents illustrate the different concepts of democracy at work in the Western zones and in the Eastern zone. The way to the Federal Republic in Bonn was paved by a Parliamentary Council whose 65 members, drawn from the councils of eleven Länder of the future federation, met in September 1948 in order to prepare a Basic Law or provisional constitution which came into effect in May 1949. Elections for the West German Government were held on the Western parliamentary model in August of that year, and in accordance with the Basic Law the President, Chancellor and Cabinet of the new Federal Republic were then chosen in September.

In East Germany the procedure differed. There the Communist-controlled mass organisations joined to form a "German People's Congress" which at its meeting in March 1948 elected a "German People's Council" consisting of 400 members. This Council adopted the Constitution of the German Democratic Republic and on October 7, 1949 constituted itself as "the Provisional People's Chamber" of the new state.

As soon as the two Republics had been set up, the head of each of them denounced the other in no uncertain terms. "The West German separate state is showing even at the hour of birth all the pathological symptoms of a political changeling, all the signs of crisis, and it will therefore not stand up to the judgment of history," declared Premier Grothwohl of the East German Republic on October 12, 1949. His opposite number in the Western Republic, Chancellor Dr. Adenauer nine days later asserted that "there is no free will of the German people in the Soviet Zone . . . The Federal Republic of Germany is alone entitled to speak for

the German people. It does not recognise declarations of the Soviet Zone as binding on the German people."

As it is explained in the preface, in the selection of these documents "emphasis has been placed on the implementation of policies rather than upon their formulation at international conferences and in diplomatic exchanges." Nevertheless, the volume includes some very significant speeches by the U.S.A. and Russian Foreign Ministers which, put together, throw much light on the gradual estrangement and the division between Soviet Russia and the West over Germany. There is Mr. Bevin's half sorrowful, half hopeful report in the Commons on 4 June, 1946, on a meeting of the "Council of Foreign Ministers" in Paris, in which he said: "The Potsdam Agreement envisaged Germany being treated as a whole, which meant that the surplus food supplies of the East would feed the West, and the goods of the West would go to the East, and so on, and sufficient earnings would be produced, so that Germany would not be a charge on any of the Allies. That was the basis. We, His Majesty's Government, cannot accept the position which involves a budgetary expenditure of £80 million a year to subsidise Germany. We cannot accept the position that the Soviet Zone is an exclusive place, while our zone is wide open for inspection, and we are subject to accusations for which there is not the slightest justification. As soon as that point of principle is settled, as I hope it will be, and there is a real, honest endeavour to tackle the whole problem, I believe that we can make progress on the German situation."

Six months later, on October 22, 1946, the British Foreign Secretary expressed his appreciation of a statement made by Secretary of State Byrnes on September 6 at Stuttgart, in which he had emphasised that the American armed forces would remain in Germany as long as there was an occupation army there. Bevin called this continuance of American interest in Europe "vital to the peace of Europe and particularly to the future of Germany. In fact, it is one of the brightest parts of the post-war picture, and one of the main grounds for hope that we shall reach a better settlement this time than we did at the end of the last war." In the same speech Bevin welcomed a recent categorical denial by Stalin "of the idea that Russia might be intending to use Germany against the West," adding that "we can only hope that Marshal Stalin's words will, in practice, make easier co-operation between the Allies in the German and other questions."

At the same time, Mr. Bevin complained that the Russians were not observing the basic provision of the Potsdam Agreement of July 1945, that Germany shall be treated as an economic unit. In fact, he said, "Eastern Germany and Western Germany are treated as two separate economic units. . . . We and the Americans have had to buy food and other goods to send into Western Germany, while the Russians are taking

similar goods from Eastern Germany into Russia. This is a situation which cannot go on. We must either have Potsdam observed as a whole, and in the order of its decision, or we must have a new agreement."

On the other hand, Mr. Molotov expressed at the same time his uneasiness about a passage in the Stuttgart speech by Mr. Byrnes on Poland's northern and western frontiers with Germany. The American Secretary of State had declared that a final settlement of these frontiers had still to be agreed upon. Mr. Molotov argued in reply on September 16 that "the historic decision of the Berlin conference regarding Poland's western frontier cannot be shaken by anyone. And the facts moreover show that to do so now is simply impossible." From that time onward the policies of the Western Powers and of Soviet Russia pursued opposite courses and the chances for a re-unification of Germany faded away. By June 1948 a London Conference of Six Powers, comprising U.S.A., the United Kingdom, France and the three Benelux countries decided that the time had come for allowing Western Germany a constitution and a government of her own. Three weeks later on June 24, a conference of the foreign ministers of the U.S.S.R. and of seven East European satellite states at Warsaw denounced this decision as "designed to consummate the division and dismemberment of Germany," as "frustrating the conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany" and thus being "a gross violation of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements." From then on the problem of the re-unification of Germany has become one of the skeletons in the cupboard of international politics.

Even in our post-Stalin era of "peaceful co-existence" no solution has been reached. It remains to be seen how far the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Western Germany and the Soviet Union, following Dr. Adenauer's visit to Moscow in September 1955 will have any major significance. To-day some politicians in Bonn regard Dr. Adenauer's uncompromising adherence to the Western camp as too rigid. The recent advance of the younger set in the Free Democratic Party, of men who seem to be largely opportunist in their attitude, may well one day make for a different attitude to Russia—particularly should the next Federal election in September 1957 reduce the strength of Adenauer's party, the Christian Democrats. The attitude of the Social Democrats, now in opposition, may also point to somewhat closer relations with Russia, if they come to power.

In spite of this semi-permanent division Germany, or at least Western Germany, has travelled a long way since the fateful formula of "Unconditional Surrender" was coined or more precisely, adopted by President Roosevelt and accepted by Mr. Churchill at the conference at Casablanca in January 1943. There the American President told British press correspondents how that great American soldier U. S. Grant of Civil War fame had been nicknamed "Unconditional Surrender" Grant—an interesting

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sidelight on the evolution and transformation of a political concept in the process of history. For "Unconditional Surrender to-day", Roosevelt had added with emphasis, "meant unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy and Japan, and that meant a reasonable reassurance of future world peace."

It is to be welcomed that the editor has included a number of documents relevant to this principle of "unconditional surrender" which was later to gain historical status by its incorporation in the "Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority with respect to Germany," signed by the Allied Representatives of the four major powers in Berlin on June 5, 1945. Two explanations given by Mr. Churchill during debates on Germany in the Commons on July 21 and November 17, 1949 illuminate both the genesis of that formula and his own considerable change of attitude on the German question since Casablanca. These statements, like many other documents in the volume, form indispensable raw material for anyone who wishes to understand the tangled history of contemporary Germany and with it a vital part of international affairs.

Notes

The Problem of Palestine

By Douglas Whitton

Palestine is a tiny piece of the Middle East, on the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean. It is about the size of Wales, and less than half the area of Tasmania. Israel occupies about two-thirds of Palestine.

Yet, in recent years, the Problem of Palestine, and the many individual problems which constitute that Problem, have brought the world on at least one occasion to the very edge of the yawning abyss of World War Three. The most pressing of these problems are: the recognition of Israel by the Arab States; and the Arab Refugees.

Any problem which involves discussion of interests of Arabs and Jews¹ stirs a number of emotions. The Jew is seen in the light of "thy people of Israel didst thou make thine own people for ever; and thou becamest their God."² or as the tycoon usually held responsible for that exorbitant hire-purchase agreement. The Arab is seen as that rag-garbed wharf lounge so familiar at Aden and Port Said to casual voyagers on the U.K.-Australia run or, at the other extreme, the hero of thrilling adventure such as befell old Aūda in Lawrence's *Seven Pillars*.

The Arab States refuse to recognise Israel because, they claim, Israel has no right to the land it occupies. The Jews claim Israel on a number of grounds: historical association, longing for the Return to the Promised Land, and the Balfour Declaration. The Arabs claim that the land is theirs because of historical association and occupancy.

The Jews came to Palestine about 1500 B.C. and were dispersed as a people in 63 B.C. although spirited attempts to re-establish themselves persisted until 135 A.D. Of course pockets of Jews remained in Palestine but never again were they the majority of Jewry. Arab rule of Palestine commenced about 640 A.D. and continued to about 1,000 A.D. Thereafter various States ruled Palestine although the majority of its inhabitants continued to be Arabs, down to 1948/9 in the case of Israel. Further, the Arabs claim that the Arabs of Palestine are the descendants of the original inhabitants of Palestine—the land of the Philistines—who had been subjugated by the incoming Jews. Anyone familiar with the Old Testament is familiar with

1. For the purposes of this article no attempt will be made to differentiate between Jews and Zionists, their politico-religious expression, nor will any attempt be made to argue that not all Jews are Zionists. Where necessary Israel and Israelis will be used in the modern national sense.
2. I Chronicles, 18, 22. This has been put in another light by Prof. Toynbee. "They (the Jews) persuaded themselves that Israel's discovery of the one true God had revealed Israel itself to be God's chosen people."

the longing of the Jews to return to Palestine. A reading of reports of Royal Commissions, etc., will testify to the same intensity of feeling held by modern Jewry. Such a longing is intensified by and is part of the world problem of persecuted Jewish minorities—in the case of the Hitlerite darkness this reached an almost-successful attempt at genocide.

The Balfour Declaration was one of a series of undertakings by Britain during World War One; another was contained in the McMahon Correspondence. Whatever Britain *meant* to say in these undertakings, what she *did* in fact say convinced both Arab and Jew that he, and he alone, had been promised Palestine. The McMahon Correspondence was an exchange of letters between Sir Henry McMahon, acting on behalf of the British Government, and Sherif Hussein of Mecca who raised the flag of Arab revolt in World War One. In these letters Britain undertook to assist in the establishment of Arab rule in the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire; the Arabs claim that Palestine was not excluded from these areas. The Balfour Declaration was contained in a letter from Prime Minister Balfour to Baron Rothschild in November, 1917. That Declaration read:—

“H.M. Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish Communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country.”

The Arabs assert that (1) Britain promised territory which was not and never had been hers to promise, and (2) in any case, the Declaration never intended that there should be a Jewish majority or Jewish political rule as this would “prejudice the civil . . . rights of the existing non-Jewish (i.e. Arab) Communities.” Jews counter this by arguing that (1) the Balfour Declaration simply promised help to regain what was in fact Jewish land, and, (2) that there could be no “National Home for the Jewish People” unless the Jewish People ruled the land of the National Home.

In 1922, following the request of the Zionist organisation, the League of Nations allocated the Mandate for Palestine to Britain; the Mandatory Power to give effect to the Balfour Declaration. The incompatibility of the demands of the Mandate (and of the Declaration) led to ever-increasing tensions in Palestine: (1) restrictions on land purchase and immigration by the Jews, and (2) armed conflict between the Arabs and the Jews, and of both against Britain. Eventually, in the face of the conflicting demands of the Mandate,³ Britain in February, 1947, referred the whole problem of Palestine to the United Nations, successor to the League. Britain stated that “H.M. Government have, of themselves, no power under


3. The Peel Commission of 1937 had declared the Mandate to be unworkable.

the Mandate, to award the country either to the Jews or to the Arabs, or even to partition it between them."

Thereupon the United Nations set up an eleven-nation commission⁴ to make recommendations on the problem. This commission presented its report in August, 1947. The report contained two unanimous recommendations:—The Mandate to be terminated, and Palestine to be granted independence, both at the earliest practicable date. But, on the vital question of the precise *form* of that independence, the commission could not agree. The majority recommended that Palestine be partitioned into an Arab and a Jewish State, and that Jerusalem be internationalised. A majority of three proposed a federal state with Jewish and Arab cantons, Jerusalem to be the federal capital. The United Nations debated the whole problem—proceedings included intensive lobbying and vote shuffling—but by the end of 1947 accepted in broad outline the majority report. [Map 1]. Britain declared that it would take no part in enforcing a decision which was not acceptable to both Arab and Jew; the Arabs bitterly opposed partition and therefore Britain relinquished the Mandate in May, 1948, and a month later the last British soldier left what, at midnight 14/15th May, 1948, had become the State of Israel. By that time, however, Palestine had become a battlefield between Jews and Arabs; both sides committed atrocities during the course of the fighting, e.g. Dar Yasseim by the Jews and Beth Haarava by the Arabs. To the surprise of almost everyone, the possible exception of the Israelis themselves, Israel inflicted defeat on the Arab forces in the two phases of the war and by the end of the year, by armistice agreement, Israel's borders were as they are today, but the armistice has not moved into peace, nor is there any real sign that it is likely to do so in the foreseeable future. Although defeated in the field the Arabs continued to hold one trump card: most of the routes to Palestine run through Arab territory and this fact makes it possible for the Arab States to institute, and to this day to continue, an economic blockade of Israel. This has been particularly successful in the case of ships passing through the Suez Canal or up the Gulf of Akaba en route to or carrying goods for transhipment to Israel. This economic blockade has denied Israel the full fruits of her military victory, and, despite United Nations requests to Egypt to lift the blockade on ships passing through the Suez Canal, this economic blockade is likely to continue. In this, as in all things, the Arab States refuse, as they have refused in all United Nations debates, to accept the fact of Israel. So emerged the first of the two major problems in the Palestine Problem today.

Much criticism has been levelled at Britain for her sitting-on-the-fence attitude in the United Nations debates on Palestine. Part of the dilemma faced by Britain at that time is summed up by Mr. Attlee, the then Prime Minister:

4. This was the twenty-second commission to investigate the Palestine Problem in the thirty-five years of the Mandate!



"We were faced with a legacy of the past in the incompatible assurances that had been given to Arabs and Jews. The sufferings of the Jews under the Nazi regime, the romantic adventure of the Palestine experiment and the wealth of sentiment for the Jewish national home enlisted great support for the Jews, whose influence extended widely throughout the world. On the other hand, the Arabs, as the inhabitants of Palestine for centuries, had a case which was sometimes ignored."⁵ Also, it is not usually recognised that Britain has contributed about a quarter of the funds of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA).

The second of the major problems in the Palestine Problem is the Arab Refugees. During the course of Arab-Israel fighting about three-quarters of a million Arabs left their homes in Palestine and sought shelter from the fighting in the neighbouring Arab countries. There they have been kept alive by the assistance of various United Nations Agencies. But, today, eight years after their exodus, they have been unable to settle in their host countries or to return to Israel. In fact, in the words of the Final Report of the UN Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East: "The Arab Refugees—nearly three-quarters of a million men, women, and children—are the symbol of the paramount political issue in the Near East."

Why have these Arab Refugees been unable either to return to their homes in Israel or to settle in neighbouring Arab countries? The simple but unpleasant answer is that neither the Arab States nor Israel is prepared to accept them as citizens.

The Arab States refuse to absorb the Arab Refugees for two main reasons. The first is that to do so could be construed as recognising the finality of their exodus from Israel and therefore Arab recognition of the fact of Israel. No Arab government at this moment is strong enough to face that risk. Colonel Shishakli, who headed what was probably the best administration Syria had ever had, was deposed and forced to flee the country when he moved towards absorption of the Arab Refugees within Syrian borders. The second reason is that, with the exception of Syria, the Arab countries are not in a position to absorb large numbers of the Refugees. All Arab countries are fighting to maintain parity between production of the necessities of life and the rapidly increasing population. (For example, it is estimated that in Egypt the standard of living of the peasants fell by 39 per cent. between 1914 and 1952 (mainly as a result of a population increase of nine million). Nor are the many schemes for land reclamation, which have been suggested to the Arab government, as practicable in fact as they are on paper. A number of small schemes have been successful e.g., The Arab Development Society, under the presidency of Mr. Musa el-Alami, against United Nations technical advice has established a successful settlement for about one thousand refugees in the Jordan

5. Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee: "As It Happened."

Valley near historic Jericho. But attempts at mass settlement have not been fruitful: one promising attempt to settle fifty-thousand refugees is being made by Egypt in conjunction with the United Nations. This scheme requires that water be brought from the Nile, passed under the Suez Canal, and so to Sinai and "it is estimated that the water could be delivered to the Sinai strip after the second year. Then, if all phases had been carried out simultaneously, refugees could be settled in stages over another two or three years." Two snags emerge from such a scheme: can the Refugee problem be allowed to stagnate for another five years (and such a scheme would account for only about six per cent. of the total), and the water for the project would add to the demands for an already inadequate flow of Nile water. Another problem of the Arab Refugees is their social and political impact on their host country. For example, it is almost certain that were they to be included in a census in Lebanon there would be a distinct Moslem majority; yet the present parliamentary set-up is based on a slight Christian majority. Recent events in Jordan have been traced, in a R.I.I.A. publication, to political organisation brought to that country by Palestinian Arabs.

Israel is not prepared to agree to the repatriation of Arab Refugees for a number of reasons. The first is that she is afraid that if the Refugees were to be readmitted the Jews would be a minority to the Arabs.⁶ The second is that Jewish immigration has been based on the dwellings and fields evacuated by the Refugees. Therefore, were the Refugees to return to the homes, etc. which they left then the present Jewish occupants would have to be dispossessed; that would be political suicide for any government in Israel. Another reason put forward by Israel, and touched on by the U.N. Middle East Survey, against the repatriation of Arab Refugees is that they would not fit into Israel in view of the far-reaching social and economic changes which have taken place in Israel since their exodus eight years ago. In general terms, it may be summed up: Israel rejects repatriation en masse and suggests compensation⁷ to the Refugees; this compensation to be paid out of an international loan. The Arab States demand complete repatriation of refugees.

Two other problems which emerge from the Problem of Palestine are: the position of Jewish nationals of other countries; and Israel in regard to world Jewry. It is not proposed to consider either problem here but it should be remembered that these problems do exist. The first is sharply brought out by quoting two influential Jews:—

"I have sought to serve Australia loyally at all times, yet I yield

6. At the Lausanne Conference 1949, an Israeli suggestion that, as part of a general peace settlement, sufficient Arab Refugees should be readmitted to Israel to make the Arab population a quarter of the population of the State was repudiated by the Israeli Parliament; and not accepted by the Arabs.

7. Estimates of the assets in Israel of Arab Refugees have ranged from £200 to £500 million.

to none in my loyal devotion to my historical and spiritual ties with Israel."⁸

"I did not feel that a yen for Jewish Statehood was a necessary component of either my Jewish faith or my compassion for Hitler's victims."⁹

The second problem begs the question of Israel policy—"a State destined for the whole People, and its doors are open wide to every Jew."¹⁰—when one compares the postage-stamp size of Israel to the twelve to fifteen million Jews throughout the world.

All sides—Arab, Israel, and the United Nations—have submitted proposals aimed at solving the Problem of Palestine. The Arab proposals may be summed up as: no Israel; repatriation of Arab Refugees. However recently there has been some movement towards tentative acceptance of the 1947 United Nations resolution: partition of Palestine and internationalisation of Jerusalem; with repatriation of Arab Refugees.

The Israel proposals amount to: Israel to stand within today's borders; the present armistice agreements with the Arab States to be superseded by a Peace Treaty; the Arabs to lift their economic blockade of Israel, particularly as affecting the Suez Canal, the U.N. resolution on which to be put into effect by Egypt; and small-scale return of Arab Refugees—not necessarily to their former homes and lands—and compensation of the remainder out of an international loan.

Various proposals have been suggested by the United Nations and its agencies. The original United Nations Resolution of November, 1947: (1) Partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab State (2) Jerusalem, holy to Jews, Christians, and Moslems¹¹ to be internationalised was caught up in the Arab-Israel War of 1948 and was not given effect. Later, the United Nations mediator, Count Bernadotte, on 16th Sept., '48, the day before his assassination by Jewish extremists, submitted the following proposals [Map 2]:—

- (1) Negeb to be Arab territory; Galilee to be Jewish.
- (2) Haifa to be a free seaport; Lydda to be a free airport.
- (3) Jerusalem to be under U.N. control but with as much local autonomy as possible for the Arab and Jewish communities.
- (4) U.N. to affirm the right of the Arab Refugees to return to their homes in Israel at the earliest possible date.

Britain and U.S.A. gave "wholehearted and unqualified support to these recommendations". However, the Syrian delegate to the United

8. Mr. G. V. Davis, President, N.S.W. Jewish Board of Deputies, in a newspaper attack on a fellow-Jew: 30/3/56, *Australian Jewish Times*.

9. Mr. A. Lilienthal, American Jew, in *What Price Israel*.

10. Israel Government Yearbook, 1952.

11. Moslems believe that Muhammed, when he left this earthly life and ascended to Heaven, made his Heavenward flight from Jerusalem. It is one of the three holy cities of Islam.

Nations declared that Bernadotte's proposals would make the Middle East "a permanent storm centre." The Israeli delegate would not accept the proposals "even as a basis for discussion."

In December, 1948, the United Nations decided:—

- (1) Jerusalem to be placed under effective U.N. control.
- (2) Refugees to have the right to return to their homes if they wished, or to compensation if they did not.

Roughly, that is where the position stands today (although there has been territorial change: Israel, by military conquest, now controls Negeb, Galilee, and the Jewish part of Jerusalem). Hopes of solution have never been darker; need of a solution, viewed against a menacing background of the threat of nuclear warfare, has never been greater.

Briefly, it would seem to this writer, that two approaches may be made to the two most pressing problems. *Israel's place in the Middle East.* The Arab States should recognise that Israel has come to stay on the map of the Middle East, but that some territorial adjustment is justified. For example, Israel should cede a strip of territory on the Gulf of Akaba so as to effect a permanent landbridge between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world; also Haifa, Elath (Israeli port on Gulf of Akaba), Gaza, and Lydda should be declared free ports. These proposals demand material sacrifices and loss of face by both parties to the dispute. Israel would, in effect, lose her backdoor to the East but would receive a material benefit from Arab recognition—the lifting of the Arab blockade. The Arab States would have to abandon their claim to the territory of Israel, but would see Israel permanently contained within her present (but slightly modified) boundaries with the advantage that Jordan would have an outlet to the Mediterranean through the free port of Haifa. *The Arab Refugees.* This problem is the more complex of the two and even a political settlement would not, of itself, solve this problem. It is manifestly obvious that if the Arab Refugees were to return to their homes in Israel, in whatever number, the Israeli inhabitants of these homes would have to be dispossessed; for it is on these homes that Israel has been able to build the remarkable immigration programme which enables a migrant family to be installed in a village "in a barely furnished two-room bungalow . . . citizens of the State of Israel" within eight hours of disembarking at Haifa. The Arab Refugee problem emerged as a direct result of international action to solve the Jewish Refugee problem; therefore it is not out of the question to suggest that the solution (as opposed to the present policy of alleviation of misery) of the Arab Refugee problem should be tackled at an international level. Firstly, the Arab Refugees should be given the opportunity of returning to their homes, although it should be made clear to them that they would be returning to Israel, not to Palestine. Such returnees should be automatically granted Israeli citizenship on a par with the citizenship granted to the Jewish citizens of Israel. Secondly, any

refugees refusing repatriation should be compensated in full out of an international loan to Israel. Thirdly, those not accepting repatriation should be given the opportunity of settling permanently in Arab countries, in accordance with the *present economic realities* of these countries. Such realities do not correspond to: "the Land of the Nile flows with milk and honey . . . and Syria choking with fruits and abundance of everything."¹²

Those refugees unable to be absorbed into the Arab countries, and there would be many, should be given the opportunity and assistance to emigrate to member states of United Nations e.g. Australia. (It is recognised that this would raise the question of the White Australia Policy, but it is also recognised that Australia played a leading part in the creation of Israel and therefore in bringing into being the present dilemma of the Arab Refugee problem. Further, this would demand a change of policy by the Arab States because, at the moment, these States oppose emigration of Arab refugees.)

However, whatever the details, the chances of settlement demand a change of attitude by both sides. The Arabs have declared, time after time, their intention of exterminating Israel e.g. "The Arabs intend that they (the Arab refugees) return as master of the homeland . . . they intend to annihilate the State of Israel"¹³ and, again: "The first thought of the Arab statesmen is therefore to increase their military strength so as to surround Israel with an unbreakable iron ring."¹⁴

On an equal number of occasions Jews have made it plain that they demand control beyond the confines of the present borders of Israel. For example, on 3rd February, 1919 the Zionist organisation submitted to the Versailles Peace Conference a proposal that a Jewish Commonwealth should be created, this commonwealth to embrace Transjordan, and South Lebanon (as far as a line running eastwards from just south of Sidon) in addition to Palestine west of the Jordan. Also, "in Eastern Palestine there are broader and emptier acres, and Jordan is not necessarily the perpetual limit to our immigration and settlement."¹⁵ Furthermore, at the last parliamentary election held in Israel the expansionist party, Herut, was returned as the second largest party in the Knesset.

Neither of these attitudes give any ground for confidence, or even reasonable hope, that an early settlement of the Problem of Palestine is likely.

12. *News From Israel* (Govt. of Israel publication), 1st August, 1955.

13. Mohamed Salah el Din, then Foreign Minister of Egypt, in *Al Misri* daily newspaper, Cairo, 11th October, 1949.

14. Edward Atiyah, former Director of Arab Office, London, in *The Arabs*.

15. David Ben-Gurion, now Prime Minister of Israel, at 17th Zionist Congress, Basle, June-July, 1931.

Misconceptions About the Negroes in the U.S.A.


By E. J. Donath

There are many misconceptions about the negroes in the U.S.A., especially as to their total number and geographical distribution. How many negroes are in the U.S.A., what is their natural increase (excess of births over deaths), and in which parts of this huge country (as large as Australia!) do they live?

Influenced by certain reports, many people might think that the U.S.A. is "swamped" with negroes; of the total population of more than 160,000,000 less than ten per cent. are negroes. And there is no indication at all that the white population may become a minority in a few decades! The stories about the "terrific birthrate" of the negroes are simply not true. The 1940-1950 intercensal increase was about 19,000,000 (including about 1,000,000 immigrants), and the negro increase in percentage was about the same as that of the white population. In fact, for many decades the negro problem has been discussed as that of the "submerged tenth". Actually the percentage of negroes is declining, because at the first census in 1790, the negro population amounted to 20 per cent. of the total of about 4,000,000 Americans. In this century the number of negroes increased from less than 9,000,000 in 1900 to over 15,000,000 in 1956; although the negro population increased by over 6,000,000, their percentage declined, because the total population of the U.S.A. more than doubled in this century (being 76,000,000, in 1900). From a percentage of about 12 in 1900, the negro population has dropped to less than ten per cent., thus there is no statistical proof for the claim that the U.S.A. is "swamped" by negroes, and the whites will soon find themselves in a minority. In fact, the opposite trend can be noted, namely, that the negro population is declining in numerical importance.

Contrary to what many people claim, none of the 48 States has a negro majority (as it used to be some decades ago). The State of Mississippi in the "deep south" on the eastern bank of the lower course of the "mighty river" has the highest percentage of negroes—45. In Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina, the negro percentage is between a third and 45. The geographical distribution of the negroes has changed very much in this century. Whilst in 1900 nearly all of the 9,000,000 negroes lived in the south-east, today only about 60 per cent. live in the southernmost states from Texas to Virginia. About one third of the negro popu-

lation lives in the highly industrialised north-eastern states containing the 4 largest cities of the Union. Not many negroes live in the Far West, except in Los Angeles and San Francisco, (which have a percentage of 6 and 10.) Although Haarlem is the largest negro city in the world, and with nearly one million constitutes the largest urban concentration of negroes, New York's percentage is only about 8, whilst Philadelphia's nearly half a million negroes represent 15% of its inhabitants. No large city in the U.S.A. has a majority of negroes! Of the southern cities in the half-million class or larger, Birmingham in Alabama has the largest proportion of negroes—41%. Negroes live in practically every region of the U.S.A.; of the states east of the Mississippi only Wisconsin (between the upper Mississippi and Lake Michigan) and the northern New England States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont are almost completely uninhabited by Negroes. Famous Boston with nearly one million inhabitants has the lowest percentage of negroes among the very large cities—2.5. On the other hand, over large parts of the Mississippi river flood plain, in the Black Belt of Alabama, in Central Georgia, and South Carolina, one can find 2 or 3 negroes to each white inhabitant. But even in the South, there are large areas where only one person in more than twenty is a Negro. In most of Oklahoma, western Texas, and northwestern Arkansas, and in



This graph shows (a) that over the last 60 years the negro population has increased from 7,000,000 to 14,900,000, whilst the total population of the U.S.A. has increased from 63,000,000 to 152,000,000; that is to say—whilst the negroes have hardly increased by 100%, the whites have increased by 140%. (b) Accordingly the negroes have declined from more than 12% in 1890 to less than 10% in 1950.

the mountain lands of West Virginia, western Carolina and Virginia, and in eastern Kentucky and Tennessee, less than 5 per cent. of the population is negro. Every state in the south has areas with hardly any negro population or none at all.

Two well-known American geographers (Calef and Nelson) have published maps on the distribution of negro population in the U.S.A. in the *Geographical Review*, and in their comments on these maps they came to the following conclusions: "The geographical distribution of negroes is slowly becoming more like the rest of the population. But even if present trends continue, it will probably take several more decades to complete a proportionate distribution of negroes. Negroes have been much less urbanized than the remainder of the population, but recently they have been migrating to cities at a rate faster than the national rate, so that they are now about as urbanized as the white population."

My brief discourse has necessarily been statistical but it may help to understand better the present "negro problem" in the U.S.A. which to my mind is rather a problem of the white American. Also in other parts of the world people of European descent will have to adjust their "colour" prejudices to the conditions of the second half of the twentieth century; we are witnessing the rise of new "black" and "yellow" nations, and those white nations which cannot read the signs of time are heading for great trouble. The majority of Americans are well aware of it, and so it can be hoped that in the near future all American negroes will enjoy full citizenship, irrelevant of whether they live in the new cities of the Far West, in the Rocky Mountain states, in the plains of the Middle West, in the "tolerant" North-east, or even in the "Deep South".

Reviews

"A HISTORY OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA," by D. G. E. Hall. (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1955), pp. xvi plus 807. (Australian price, 62/-.)

Professor D. G. E. Hall is already well-known to students of South-East Asia for the many distinguished contributions which he has made to the history of Burma. Until his appointment to the Chair of South-East Asian History in the University of London, he was for a number of years in charge of the Department of History in the University of Rangoon, and while his interests in South-East Asia have broadened, there is little doubt that Burma remains his first love. The chapters on that country in his monumental *History of South-East Asia* are superbly executed, and constitute the best part of the book. However, although this scholarly work seems certain to become the definitive historical study of the area, it nevertheless has certain limitations.

The first of these relates to the structure of the book itself. Unlike B. Harrison's *South-East Asia: A Short History* (1954), which treated South-East Asia as a whole in topical and chronological sequence, Professor Hall's book examines each country in separate chapters. For this reason it is not so successful as Professor Harrison's stimulating little book in conveying the sense of historical unity of South-East Asia.

Another limitation of the study is the exclusion of the Philippines from the author's definition of the term "South-East Asia"—an exclusion which he justifies by stating that the Philippines stood outside the main stream of historical developments in the area. This is perhaps true in that Hindu and Islamic cultural influences were not so marked in the Philippines as elsewhere, but it is certainly not true of developments in the colonial period. In the two previous historical studies of South-East Asia by Dr. V. Purcell and Professor B. Harrison the Philippines were included, and on ethnological grounds the Philippines must certainly be considered as forming part of South-East Asia. The older writers used the term "Indonesia," in its original non-political sense, to describe not only the Dutch East Indies but also the Philippines, and Robequain states quite categorically that the Philippines form part of the East Indian Archipelago in respect to the super-position and juxtaposition of the ethnic groups, modes of life, and in the mingling waves of cultural influence. Altogether, the restricted definition of "South-East Asia" advanced here is very arbitrary.

In the preface to his book, Professor Hall criticizes the tendency, which was attacked warmly by the late Dutch historian Van Leur during the 'thirties and by Dr. J. G. de Casparis and Professor W. F. Wertheim in recent years, of adopting Western historical categories and a Western

viewpoint in interpreting Asian history. He therefore states as his object "first and foremost to present South-East Asia historically as an area worthy of consideration in its own right, and not merely when brought into contact with China, India or the West," for its history "cannot be safely viewed from any other perspective until seen from its own." There are occasions when the author succeeds in achieving this aim, but the fact that he succumbs to an equally dangerous tendency of concentrating upon dynastic rivalries, instead of presenting the economic, social and cultural history of the area, means that the South-East Asian perspective which he was attempting to create is largely still-born. It is a curious fact that the industrial development of the last century which liberated the history of Western Europe from the narrow confines of palace intrigues, and led to greater emphasis being placed upon social and economic history, has not had the same effect upon the historiography of South-East Asia. Whereas today we know a good deal about the peasantry of Europe during, say, the eighteenth century, we know extraordinarily little about the economic position of the South-East Asian peoples at this time.

There is, of course, much to justify Professor Hall's treatment of the early period of South-East Asian history. Where so many inscriptions and other local sources are still awaiting detailed examination and interpretation, he has had to rely of necessity upon the few specialist studies by Cœdès, Krom, Stutterheim, Heine-Geldern and C. C. Berg. But the vast number of articles, monographs, published collections of documents, and books relating to the colonial period hardly provide the same justification for the inadequate attention paid by him to the economic and social foundations of South-East Asian countries during the past two or three centuries. There exists scattered published material on Javanese social organization of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and such things as Bodawpaya's revenue survey of the early nineteenth century, which Professor Hall dismisses in half a dozen lines, would also provide, presumably, excellent source material for a study of social and economic conditions in Burma before British penetration. However, except for a short chapter on the economic aspect of European domination during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there is no discussion in this book of the effects of Western rule upon the social and cultural patterns of the South-East Asian communities—upon their methods of agriculture, systems of customary law, and so forth. Despite the intentions stated in the preface, Professor Hall's interpretation of the colonial period follows closely the time-worn path of earlier general studies.

In Part I of the book the emergence of the Indonesian empires of Srivijaya and Majapahit, the Khmer and Champa kingdoms of Indo-China, and the Ayut'ia kingdom of Siam are discussed, and the history of Burma is carried from the pre-Pagan period down to the Shan attack on Ava at the beginning of the sixteenth century. In examining the Indian cultural

influence on South-East Asia, Professor Hall stresses the fact that today more weight is being placed by scholars of the Hindu period upon the local sources of culture. The author argues in this connection against the older view of Hindu colonization of Indonesia as represented by Krom, but he makes no use here of Professor F. D. K. Bosch's important inaugural lecture or Van Leur's economic studies on the subject.

In the second and third parts of the book, which cover the period from the arrival of the Portuguese down to the end of the nineteenth century, there is to be found a good deal of original material, the result of Professor Hall's own research, relating to Arakan and Bodawpaya's reign in Burma. Generally speaking, however, the account follows the standard works, but with some omissions. Thus Bugis penetration into Malaya during the eighteenth century is discussed in some detail (pp. 290-5), but the influence of the Bugis in West Sumatra is ignored. More important still, Menangkabau, apart from reference to the Menangkabau influence in Malaya itself, is given scant attention. Sumatra as a whole, in fact, except in so far as it constituted an area of rivalry between the Dutch and the British, is largely ignored.

The development of nationalist movements in South-East Asia in the present century, and the challenge which these movements posed to established Western rule, are examined in the final part of the book. Here the author displays a maturity of judgment and impartiality which is rarely found in recent studies on the subject. He is strongly critical of certain aspects of Dutch and French colonial rule, but this does not lead him into making a sweeping condemnation of all aspects of colonialism. "The imperial powers," he writes, "provided a vast amount of capital and technical skill, without which the development of the 'colonial' territories to their present economic importance could never have taken place. They revolutionized health conditions and delivered great masses of people from the decimating or enfeebling dominion of frightful diseases. Their research in tropical agriculture and their scientific investigation into other matters of fundamental importance laid the sure foundations on which prosperity and higher standards of life could be built up" (pp. 670-1).

There are a number of minor errors throughout the text and in the bibliography, the spelling of place-names and the footnote references are often inconsistent, and one or two dates are incorrectly given. Professor Hall also mistakenly identifies R. T. Farquhar (later Sir Robert), the British commercial Resident at Amboina, with William Farquhar, the first Resident of Singapore (pp. 431-2; 439-40); and states incorrectly (pp. 281; 294) that the Dutch colonies in the East were taken control of by the British during the Napoleonic Wars as a result of Willem V's Kew Letters. These colonies, in fact, fell to the British by conquest. On page 276 the author refers to the Third Javanese War of the eighteenth century as the "most destructive of all . . . wars" in Java, but this does not take into account

the Java War of 1825-30; on page 415 only one of the Sultans of Tjeribon is referred to, whereas there were three of them at this period; on page 417 it is incorrectly asserted that colonial revenues did not increase under the early land rent system in Java; and on page 409 the British blockade is advanced as the main reason for Daendels' failure to get rid of his supplies of coffee, whereas a more cogent reason was the American Embargo Act and the elimination of Danish neutral shipping by British naval action off Copenhagen. Finally, in the very useful lists of South-East Asian dynasties appended to the book, Amangkubuwana III's period is incorrectly dated in the list of the Sultans of Jogjakarta.

Such errors have probably been due to the fact, which is sometimes very evident, that the book has been based mainly upon lectures delivered in the Universities of London, Rangoon, Malaya, Indonesia and Chulalongkorn. In making these criticisms, however, it is to be hoped that they will not obscure the singular importance of this study.

JOHN BASTIN.

**"ONE MAN IN HIS TIME," by N. M. Borodin, D.Sc. London,
Constable, 1955. Pp. 8 and 344.**

One day in August, 1948, while stationed in London, Dr. Borodin wrote to the Soviet Ambassador to say that he had decided to renounce his citizenship of the Soviet Union. A citizen should have the right, he said in the letter, openly to disagree with the policy of the political regime; seeing that "a Soviet citizen who criticises the government dooms himself to death," he had chosen the only means of escape open to him, the severance of all ties with his country.

A microbiologist of distinction, who had been entrusted with important missions abroad and been awarded the Order of Lenin, he gives us vivid sketches of conditions in Russia, over a period of thirty years, at once fascinating and horrifying. Written in admirable English, Dr. Borodin's lively narrative will probably leave an impression of the Stalinist era which the reading of more solid works—or even the portentous utterances of a Khrushchev—is unlikely easily to efface. The life-story of a Russian scientist cannot fail to excite particular interest at the present time, moreover, when increasingly the Western world is becoming aware of the long and accelerating lead established by Soviet Russia in technical education and enterprise and of its aim, loudly proclaimed, to achieve world pre-eminence in industry and the sciences.

When after the October revolution of 1917 the civil war came to Kamensk, a small town on the river Donetz, the author was twelve years old. It had been a peaceful spot until then, but thereafter sudden death in one form or another came to be accepted as commonplace, at least until

the end of the terrible famine of 1921-22. Death by gunfire, by mass execution, by starvation, by lynching, he saw at close hand while still in his teens. Then came the never-ending purges of the Stalinist era, the constant arrests and executions. Of the men whom the author met in the course of his scientific career, scarcely one survived and the sequence of events was almost invariably the same: the unfortunate would be denounced, dismissed from his job, arrested and then either imprisoned or, more often, shot. Whenever the names of colleagues and acquaintances in responsible posts are mentioned, one finds oneself wondering how long exactly the individual in question will survive. Sure enough, a few pages further on, the end is always the same—denunciation, arrest, oblivion.

As a young man Nikolai Michailovich Borodin, a Don Cossack of peasant origin, had no doubts at all about the justice of the fate that befell so many around him. No mercy could be shown to the enemies of the new regime, for only by their extermination could a loyal son of the revolution hope to prosper. Fortunate enough to be "a proletarian in mind and by origin," from the start he made up his mind to be a microbiologist. At high school it was natural that he should join the Comsomol, the Communist youth organisation, but having fallen foul of the school's "political instructor," one day he found himself expelled from both school and Comsomol as "an undisciplined element with a bourgeois mind." It proved to be only a temporary reverse and in 1924 he entered upon a science course at the University of Novocherkassk.

His first important post was as director of the North Caucasus Research Institute of Animal Health at Armavir. As a "partyless Bolshevik" and "red specialist," whose work had received favourable notice in Moscow, he could view the future with confidence, which remained unshaken when the "political hurricane" unloosed by Stalin swept over Russia and countless unlucky folk who had been "devout Stalinists" one day were found to be "deviationists, foreign spies and wreckers" the next. Occasionally doubts *would* creep into Comrade Borodin's mind: could so many friends and colleagues of his own generation, apparently in complete sympathy with the new order, really be the traitors they were made out to be? But the "Borodin number two," as he puts it, who sometimes dared to question whether "the exterminated vermin were really vermin at all," could not withstand the sensible "Borodin number one," who demanded as loudly as anyone that the wreckers and saboteurs be swept from the face of the earth.

As in duty bound he maintained close contact with the G.P.U., the political police. Brought up to regard them as the guardians of the security of the State, he was proud to enjoy their confidence. When offered the job of "scientific consultant," he accepted, thus becoming a Chekist, as the members of the organisation still called themselves. Unrewarded and unpaid, it was an honourable Soviet service which "an ambitious and active

Borodin number one" undertook without compunction. We are told a good deal about the G.P.U., even if nothing particularly new is revealed about its methods. He appreciated its "magnificent efficiency" and was aware, therefore, of the danger of an unguarded utterance. Just as in the laboratory when handling pathogenic bacteria the microbiologist could never afford to relax, so now every word and movement had always to be kept under control. He did not relax and could later boast that he had never been "either infected or liquidated."

A secret report about himself, compiled from information supplied by all and sundry, by chance came into his hands. One cannot be surprised that there engraved itself upon his mind the lesson contained in the words of a popular song: *Chekists, do not trust your friends*. In such an atmosphere of fear and suspicion as prevailed, each seeking to denounce the other so as to escape suspicion himself, it is small wonder that friendship and loyalty between friends no longer existed.

When Hitler's armies overran Russia in June, 1941, Dr. Borodin had for some years been a director of the Meat Combine at Baku. Although exempted from military service, he became "a jack of all trades in the defence machine" and did so well that decorations came his way, including the scarlet and gold ribbon of the Order of Lenin, highest military and civilian order in the Soviet Union. By then he had joined the Party—for the first time, be it noted, some twenty years since his expulsion from the Comsomol—but nothing more is said about his membership of the political police and one is left to guess whether he retired and, if so, at what stage.

Of the two missions abroad with which he was entrusted from the summer of 1945 onward, first to England and then to the United States, each had as its object the obtaining of information about large-scale penicillin production. Suddenly recalled from America and re-transferred to England at the end of 1947, a few months later he decided, by renouncing his allegiance, to commit what would certainly be regarded in Moscow as high treason.

There are many gaps in the account of the foreign missions and much is left unsaid about activities which the reader would be glad to hear described in detail. It is obvious that nothing like the full story has been told, either of the events that led up to or of the reasons that prompted the drastic step of defection. The old conflict between Borodin number one and Borodin number two flared up again, we learn, and the latter finally triumphed, sickened by "all these denunciations, violence and executions" and increasingly conscious of his own responsibility, in a sense, for their continuance. To Borodin the intellectual the ruthless suppression of freedom of thought, the slavish adherence to the State ideology demanded of all scientists, had at last become intolerable.

Two or three significant warnings are mentioned, including ostensibly friendly words of advice offered by his chief in Moscow, the Minister of

Medical Industries. Dr. Borodin professes to have treated these warnings lightly, but his experienced Communist eye no doubt saw the writing on the wall. In the laboratory he had avoided infection; possibly after all he would not indefinitely avoid liquidation.

By electing defection, he made sure of escaping with liberty and life. Unlike too many of his former colleagues, he did not lack foresight—or good fortune. There used to be a family saying in the old days in Kamensk: "God is not without mercy and a Cossack is not without luck." It is to be hoped that now, wherever Borodin the Cossack may be, his luck still holds.

T. N. M. BUESST.

